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THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
OF REGULATORY CULTURE AND MINDSET 
GILL NORTH* AND ROSS BUCKLEY† 
[The Dodd–Frank Act constitutes the most significant reform of financial regulation in the United 
States since the 1930s. Some of its provisions are bold, particularly in the areas of consumer 
protection and derivative trading. However, the political challenges for law reformers and regulators 
in the wake of the global financial crisis are far from over. The Act is inchoate. The full scope and 
nature of the new financial regulatory system will take several years to evolve as the mandated 
studies and rule-making are completed and implemented. We argue that the extent to which the 
reforms achieve their stated objectives will depend most critically on three factors: (i) the compe-
tency, integrity and forcefulness of the federal regulators; (ii) the ability and willingness of those 
regulators to supervise the finance industry on an integrated basis; and (iii) whether a fundamental 
change in the regulatory culture and mindset is achieved.] 
CO N T E N T S 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................ 480 
II The Financial Regulatory Structure ....................................................................... 483 
III Supervision of Systemically Important Financial Institutions ............................... 485 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 485 
1 Financial Stability Oversight Council .......................................... 485 
2 Orderly Liquidation Authority ...................................................... 487 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 487 
IV Financial Institutions ............................................................................................. 489 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 489 
1 Insurance Companies .................................................................... 489 
2 Depository Institutions ................................................................. 490 
3 Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds ....................................... 492 
4 Credit Rating Agencies ................................................................. 492 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 494 
1 Volcker Rule ................................................................................. 494 
2 The Hedge Fund Provisions ......................................................... 497 
3 The Rating Agency Provisions ..................................................... 497 
V Capital Markets and Products ................................................................................ 499 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 499 
1 Securitisation ................................................................................ 499 
2 Derivatives and Swap Trading ...................................................... 500 
 
 * BCom (Canterbury), CA (NZ), SIE (Dip) (LSE), ASIA exams (UK), LLB (Hons) (UNE), PhD 
(UNSW); Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, The University of New South Wales. 
 † BEcon, LLB (Hons) (Qld), PhD, LLD (Melb); Professor of International Finance Law, Faculty 
of Law, The University of New South Wales; Fellow, Asian Institute of International Financial 
Law, The University of Hong Kong. The authors would like to thank the Australian Research 
Council for the Discovery Grant that made this research possible, and Martin North and the two 
anonymous referees for their valuable feedback. All responsibility rests with the authors. 
     
480 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 35 
 
     
3 Payment, Clearing and Settlement Activities ............................... 502 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 502 
VI Executive Compensation ....................................................................................... 504 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 504 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 505 
VII Consumer Protection ............................................................................................. 506 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 506 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 507 
VIII Investor Protection ................................................................................................ 512 
A Legislative Provisions ............................................................................... 512 
B Commentary and Analysis ........................................................................ 514 
1 Intermediary Conflicts of Interest ................................................ 514 
2 Intermediary Duty of Care ........................................................... 514 
3 Direct Investor Provisions ............................................................ 517 
4 Short Selling Provisions ............................................................... 517 
IX Regulatory Performance ........................................................................................ 518 
X Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 521 
I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
The global financial crisis (‘GFC’) led to widespread calls for regulatory 
change in the United States (‘US’) and elsewhere. In June 2009, President 
Barack Obama introduced a proposal for a ‘sweeping overhaul of the [American] 
financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the 
reforms that followed the Great Depression.’1 
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd–
Frank Act’)2 was signed into law by President Obama on 21 July 2010. The Act 
is named after two members of Congress: Representative Barney Frank, who 
proposed the Bill in the House of Representatives on 2 December 2009, and 
Senator Chris Dodd, the Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee. The long 
title of the Act states its purposes as being: 
• to promote the financial stability of the US by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system; 
• to end ‘too big to fail’; 
• to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts; and 
• to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices. 
The purposes of the Dodd–Frank Act reflect the major political and public 
concerns in the US during and in the wake of the GFC: 
 
 1 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform’ 
(Speech delivered at the White House, 17 June 2009) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform>. 
 2 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
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• the collapse or near collapse of major financial institutions, which had the 
potential to threaten the global financial system, with devastating economic 
and other consequences;3 
• the spending of massive amounts of taxpayer money to support or bail out 
collapsing or significantly weakened financial institutions;4 
• the perceived excessiveness of compensation paid to finance industry 
executives, particularly those of failed institutions;5 and 
• the abuse of consumers of mortgage and other credit products, reflected in 
high levels of home foreclosures and individual indebtedness.6 
Most of the Act deals with these individual areas of concern.7 However, the 
reforms also address factors that were generally acknowledged as significant 
underlying causes of the crisis, such as issues relating to the securitisation and 
derivatives markets and credit rating agencies. 
The potential scope of the Dodd–Frank Act is immense. The statute is nearly 
1000 pages long and it encompasses many aspects of financial reform. One legal 
practitioner describes it as ‘a profound increase in regulation of the financial 
services industry’.8 However, the Act is inchoate and provides only a broad 
framework. While some of the reforms came into effect the day following the 
Act’s passing into law,9 the operation of many provisions is delayed or subject to 
rule-making by the federal regulators. The regulators are required to conduct 
numerous studies and provide reports and recommendations in order to deter-
mine the provisions governing many of the most controversial reforms.10 Most 
 
 3 Title I of the Dodd–Frank Act is intended to enhance the stability of the financial system: see 
Dodd–Frank Act, § 115, 124 Stat 1376, 1403–6. The key provisions of tit I are outlined and 
discussed below in Part III of the article. 
 4 Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act provides for an orderly liquidation process that can be used to 
break up and wind down a financial institution in financial distress without any loss being borne 
by taxpayers: see Dodd–Frank Act, § 203, 124 Stat 1376, 1450–4. The orderly liquidation proc-
ess is summarised and discussed below in Part III of the article. 
 5 As outlined below in Part VI of the article, the Dodd–Frank Act contains provisions that prohibit 
incentive-based compensation, or that claw back such payments, in specified circumstances. It 
also provides for management, directors, and third parties of a failed financial company to bear 
losses consistent with their responsibility: see Dodd–Frank Act, §§ 951–6, 124 Stat 1376,  
1899–1906. 
 6 Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act provides for the establishment of a Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection and reforms to protect financial consumers: see Dodd–Frank Act,  
§§ 1011–12, 124 Stat 1376, 1964–6. These reforms are reviewed below in Part VII of the article. 
 7 As such, the reform is likely to be seen by many parties as ‘post-GFC reform’ or as regulation 
following a crisis. See, eg, Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II’ (2011) 95 Minnesota Law Review 1779. Bainbridge argues that the  
Dodd–Frank Act is a ‘bubble law, enacted in response to a major negative economic event’ and 
that it represents ‘a populist backlash against corporations and/or markets’: at 1796. 
 8 Eric J Friedman, Executive Partner, in Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates, 
The Dodd–Frank Act: Commentary and Insights (12 July 2010) <http://www.skadden.com/ 
Cimages/siteFile/Skadden_Insights_Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf >. 
 9 Dodd–Frank Act, § 4, 124 Stat 1376, 1390. 
 10 For a summary of the mandated rules, studies and reports, see Center for Capital Market 
Competitiveness, United States Chamber of Commerce, Dodd–Frank Act of 2010: Summary of 
Rulemaking, Studies, and Congressional Reports by Title <http://chamberpost.typepad.com/ 
files/dodd-frank-summary-sheet.pdf >. For links to lists of the studies and rule-makings required 
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of the rule-making is scheduled for completion within 12 months; however, the 
legislative timetables are proving to be overly ambitious.11 The full scope and 
nature of the financial regulatory framework may take several years to emerge. 
Indeed, the efficacy of some of the regulation will only be known at the time of 
the next major financial crisis. 
The importance of the legislation to financial regulation and economic devel-
opment globally is hard to exaggerate. A significant proportion of the world’s 
financial services are provided in the US or by US-based institutions. Moreover, 
as the GFC clearly highlighted, the world’s financial systems are inextricably 
interconnected. It is not feasible for a single paper to discuss the Act or critique 
its provisions comprehensively. Instead, this article provides an overview of the 
significant reforms and discusses some of the more controversial proposals. The 
primary aims of the article are to highlight the incomplete nature of the legisla-
tion and the essential reliance on federal regulators to draft, implement, supervise 
and enforce the reforms. 
The article initially discusses the financial regulatory structure created by the 
Dodd–Frank Act. The Act provides the primary federal regulators — the Federal 
Reserve (‘Fed’), the US Department of the Treasury (‘Treasury’), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’), the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (‘SEC’) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (‘CFTC’) — with 
enlarged powers and functions.12 However, the regulatory system remains 
cumbersome. The proposed reforms, far from streamlining the supervisory 
arrangements governing financial companies, add a layer of complexity to the 
multi-agency framework. 
The article then reviews the legislative reforms under the following categories: 
supervision of systemically important institutions; financial institutions; financial 
markets and products; executive compensation; consumer protection; and 
investor protection. These reviews outline the most important or significant 
provisions, and are followed by commentary and analysis. The aspirational 
objectives of the Dodd–Frank Act are largely uncontroversial. Critique of the 
regulation and provisions is more difficult given the inchoate nature of the 
legislation, the reliance on regulators to complete and manage the reform 
processes, and the need to assess the reforms using a long-term lens. 
 
to be undertaken by each organisation, see National Economic Research Associates, Dodd–Frank 
Rulemakings and Studies, NERA Economic Consulting <http://www.nera.com/6911.htm>. 
 11 This article provides only minimal commentary on events since the Dodd–Frank Act was passed. 
Ongoing updates on the reform timetables and rule-making processes are available from the 
regulator websites. See, eg, The Federal Reserve Board, Dodd–Frank Act Proposals 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/dfproposals.cfm>; US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Dodd–Frank Act <http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ 
index.htm>; US Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementing the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml>. 
There are also many third party websites providing commentary on the reform schedules and 
outcomes. 
 12 See US Government Accountability Office, Financial Regulation: Industry Trends Continue to 
Challenge the Federal Regulatory Structure (Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-32, 
October 2007) (‘GAO Industry Trends Report’) for a detailed outline of the federal regulatory 
structure prior to the reforms. 
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We complete the analysis with a discussion of regulatory performance issues, 
because the success of the legislation relies on the regulators’ willingness and 
ability to manage the reforms as an integrated package, and to work together 
with a primary focus on the bigger picture. We argue that this requires more than 
simply legislative change. The real question posed by the reforms is not whether 
the regulators have sufficient powers to achieve the stated objectives of the Act, 
but whether they are willing to proactively use these powers to prevent or to 
mitigate the negative effects of the next financial crisis.13 
I I   TH E  FI N A N C I A L RE G U L ATO RY ST R U C T U R E 
There are many papers that detail the significant financial policy reforms and 
development of the regulatory framework in the US since the 1930s.14 In 2009 
the US Government Accountability Office (‘GAO’), which acts as an independ-
ent review agency of Congress, indicated that the 
current US financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex 
arrangement of federal and state regulators — put into place over the past 150 
years — that has not kept pace with major developments in financial markets 
and products … [R]esponsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry 
are shared among almost a dozen federal … regulatory agencies … and hun-
dreds of state financial regulatory agencies.15 
Hubbard suggests the ‘fragmentation of regulators is not the product of careful 
design — it has evolved by layers of accretion since the Civil War. It has 
survived largely unchanged, despite repeated unsuccessful efforts at reform.’16 
Kushmeider indicates that ‘[m]ost observers of the US financial regulatory 
system would agree that if it did not already exist, no one would invent it.’17 She 
suggests that repeated failures to reform the system show ‘how sensitive the 
issues are for the many varied interest groups involved.’18 
The financial regulatory structure in the US prior to the introduction of the 
Dodd–Frank Act has been described as ‘functional’ — that is, financial products 
 
 13 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United 
States (January 2011) xviii, stating that ‘we do not accept the view that regulators lacked the 
power to protect the financial system. They had ample power in many arenas and they chose not 
to use it.’ 
 14 See, eg, Rose Marie Kushmeider, ‘The US Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring 
Federal Bank Regulation’ (2005) 17(4) FDIC Banking Review 1. In the appendix of the paper, 
Kushmeider provides a summary of 24 major proposals for regulatory restructuring: at 25–9. 
 15 GAO, Financial Regulation: A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize 
the Outdated US Financial Regulatory System (Report to Congressional Addressees, GAO-09-
216, January 2009) (‘GAO Framework Report’). 
 16 R Glenn Hubbard, ‘Finding the Sweet Spot for Effective Regulation’ (2009) 6(11) The 
Economists’ Voice 1, 4 <http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss11/>. Hubbard argues that the estab-
lishment of a systemic risk council is flawed and represents ‘fragmentation by another name’. 
 17 Kushmeider, above n 14, 1. 
 18 Ibid 4. 
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or activities were regulated according to their function.19 The benefits of this 
structure were: 
• a better understanding of products or activities due to regulator specialisa-
tion; 
• improved regulatory innovation due to competition among regulators; 
• checks and balances between regulators; 
• the ability for companies to select the regulator most appropriate for their 
business; and 
• a system that has generally worked well, enabling deep, liquid and efficient 
markets.20 
However, problems with the prevailing agency structure include: 
• overlapping jurisdictions making it difficult to hold any one agency 
accountable for its actions; 
• conflicts between state and federal regulators; 
• potential regulatory gaps; 
• competition between regulators in a race to the bottom for the lowest 
standards of regulation and enforcement; 
• the inability of regulators to manage complex financial institutions or 
systemic risk; 
• difficulties managing consolidated groups; and 
• entrenched constituencies.21 
An International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) report in August 2007 indicated that 
the multiple federal and state regulatory frameworks in the US overseeing the 
financial market system may limit regulatory effectiveness and slow responses to 
pressing issues.22 Two months later the GAO reported to Congressional Commit-
tees on the federal regulatory system.23 The GAO report indicated that the 
regulatory structure was challenged by the developing industry trend of large, 
complex and internationally active firms whose product offerings spanned the 
jurisdiction of several agencies.24 It highlighted unresolved issues around 
duplicative and inconsistent regulation of financial services conglomerates and 
problems with accountability when agency jurisdiction is not clearly assigned. A 
GAO report released as testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate in January 2009 reached a stronger 
 
 19 GAO Industry Trends Report, above n 12, 9. For a discussion of the characteristics of functional 
regulation, see ibid 9–10. 
 20 See, eg, GAO Industry Trends Report, above n 12, 9–10, 17–18. 
 21 Ibid 17–37. 
 22 IMF, ‘United States: 2007 Article IV Consultation — Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion’ (Country Report No 07/264, IMF, Au-
gust 2007) 18. The IMF report in August 2007 was undertaken as part of the regular consulta-
tions of member countries under art IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 
 23 GAO Industry Trends Report, above n 12, 15. 
 24 Ibid. 
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conclusion. The summary stated that ‘[a]s the nation finds itself in the midst of 
one of the worst financial crises ever, the regulatory system increasingly appears 
to be ill-suited to meet the nation’s needs in the 21st century.’25 The limitations 
and gaps posed by the fragmented regulatory arrangements were identified as: 
• a failure to mitigate systemic risk posed by large and interconnected finan-
cial conglomerates; 
• difficulties in dealing with significant market participants, such as non-
bank mortgage lenders, hedge funds and credit rating agencies; 
• challenges posed by new and complex investment products, such as retail 
mortgage and credit products; 
• difficulties in establishing accounting and audit standards that are respon-
sive to financial market developments and global trends; and 
• difficulties in coordinating international regulatory efforts.26 
The 2009 GAO report did not provide detailed proposals or solutions to ad-
dress the identified issues; instead it outlined principles that an ideal regulatory 
framework should reflect. It indicated that the framework should: have clearly 
defined regulatory goals; be comprehensive; adopt a system-wide focus; be 
efficient and effective; ensure consistent consumer and investor protection; 
ensure that regulators are independent with sufficient resources, clout and 
authority; and enable consistent financial oversight with minimal taxpayer 
exposure.27 
The legislative provisions outlined in the following Parts include reforms with 
similar regulatory aspirations to those identified by the GAO. Whether the 
reforms will achieve the desired regulatory framework remains an open question. 
I I I   SU P E RV I S I O N  O F  SY S T E M I C A L LY IM P O RTA N T 
FI N A N C I A L IN S T I T U T I O N S 
A  Legislative Provisions 
1 Financial Stability Oversight Council 
President Obama wanted to limit the overall size of individual financial institu-
tions to avoid a concentration of risk in a small number of financial companies 
and to reinforce the principle that no institution is too big to fail.28 This aspira-
tion is translated into provisions in tit I of the Dodd–Frank Act that potentially 
require systemically important companies to hold minimum levels of risk-based 
capital beyond those generally applicable under other regulations.29 Bank 
 
 25 GAO Framework Report, above n 15. 
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Ibid 48–63. 
 28 Barack Obama, ‘President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on Size and Scope of Financial 
Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers’ (Press Release, 21 January 2010) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-and-releases>. 
 29 Dodd–Frank Act, § 115, 124 Stat 1376, 1403–6. 
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holding companies with US$50 billion or more in assets and non-bank financial 
companies (‘NFCs’)30 designated as systemically important (‘designated NFCs’) 
can be made subject to ‘enhanced supervision and prudential’ requirements 
beyond those imposed by other regulations.31 Individual regulators are author-
ised to determine the specific leverage and capital measures.32 
The Fed is also empowered to act in relation to bank holding companies with 
US$50 billion or more in assets and designated NFCs that pose a ‘grave threat to 
the financial stability of the United States’.33 The Fed may: limit these compa-
nies’ ability to merge, consolidate or affiliate with another company; restrict the 
financial products they offer; require the termination of their activities; impose 
conditions on the way they conduct a business activity; and require them to sell 
or transfer assets.34 In addition, mergers, acquisitions and other business combi-
nations are prohibited if the resulting enlarged company would hold more than 
10 per cent of the total consolidated liabilities of all banks and supervised 
NFCs.35 
The reforms extend beyond concern with individual financial institutions to 
the supervision of systemic risk and financial stability. The Fed remains primar-
ily responsible for systemic risk regulation and supervision. In addition, the 
Dodd–Frank Act establishes a Financial Stability Oversight Council (‘FSOC’), 
which includes representatives from all of the major regulatory bodies,36 to 
identify risks to the financial stability of the US, to promote market discipline, 
 
 30 A non-bank financial company is defined as a company (other than a bank holding company) 
that is predominantly engaged in financial activities: ibid §§ 102(a)(4), (6), 124 Stat 1376,  
1391–2. 
 31 Ibid § 165, 124 Stat 1376, 1423–32. 
 32 Ibid § 171, 124 Stat 1376, 1435–8. 
 33 Ibid §§ 121(a), 165(j), 124 Stat 1376, 1410, 1431. 
 34 Ibid § 121(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1410. 
 35 Ibid § 622, 124 Stat 1376, 1632–4. Section 622(e) requires the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council to complete a study on the extent to which this size affects financial stability, moral 
hazard, the efficiency and competitiveness of US financial firms and markets, and the cost and 
availability of credit and other financial services to households and businesses. This study was 
completed in January 2011. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, ‘Study and Recommenda-
tions Regarding Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies’ (January 2011) 
<http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/studies-and-reports.aspx>. The Council noted 
that in 
the near term, the concentration limit is mostly likely to restrict or otherwise affect acquisitions 
by four financial institutions — Bank of America Corporation, JP Morgan Chase & Company, 
Citigroup Inc, and Wells Fargo & Company — because only these four firms, based on current 
estimates, appear to hold more than 5 per cent of the aggregate liabilities of all financial com-
panies subject to the concentration limit. 
 36 Dodd–Frank Act, § 111, 124 Stat 1376, 1392–4. The FSOC’s voting members are the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Director of the Consumer Bureau, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairperson of the Corporation, 
the Chairperson of the CFTC, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman 
of the National Credit Union Administration Board and an independent member. The non-voting 
members are the Director of the Office of Financial Research, the Director of the Federal Insur-
ance Office, a state insurance commissioner, a state banking supervisor and a state securities 
commissioner. See also FSOC, 2011 Annual Report (2011) <http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/Pages/annual-report.aspx>, which provides: (i) a review of the US financial 
system in 2011; (ii) insightful commentary on future challenges and risks; (iii) updates on the 
implementation of the Dodd–Frank Act; and (iv) recommended additional steps to strengthen the 
financial system. 
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and to respond to emerging threats.37 The role of the FSOC is to provide advice 
and to facilitate communication and coordination across the regulatory frame-
work. It is required to define and monitor systemic risk regulation, conduct 
research, keep abreast of ongoing market developments, and make recommenda-
tions on prudential standards and market activity.38 
2 Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act creates an Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(‘OLA’) that empowers the FDIC to serve as a receiver for large interconnected 
financial companies whose insolvency poses a significant risk to financial 
stability or is likely to seriously adversely affect the US economy.39 As receiver 
of a financial company, the FDIC assumes control of the liquidation process with 
broad powers.40 
The Act prohibits the use of taxpayers’ funds to prevent a liquidation and 
provides that taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any authority by 
the OLA.41 All costs are to be recouped from creditors or shareholders of the 
institution,42 from the disposition of assets of the company, or from assessments 
on other financial companies.43 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
The reforms in tits I and II of the Dodd–Frank Act reflect elements of propos-
als highlighted by scholars. Herring argued in 2009 that ‘supervisors need to 
place much greater emphasis on increasing the resilience of the system by 
ensuring that no institution is too big, too complex, or too interconnected to 
fail.’44 He suggested that systemically important institutions should be required 
to file and update a winding down plan and, where required, supervisors should 
be empowered to require changes in the size or structure of firms.45 
Skeel argues that the final reforms single out the largest institutions for special 
treatment. He suggests that the OLA processes provide ‘unconstrained regulatory 
discretion’, and that the ‘basic expectations of the rule of law — that the rules 
will be transparent and knowable in advance … [—] are subverted by this 
 
 37 Dodd–Frank Act, § 112(a)(1), 124 Stat 1376, 1394–5. 
 38 Ibid § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat 1376, 1395–6. 
 39 Ibid § 203, 124 Stat 1376, 1450–4. To be placed into receivership under the OLA, a financial 
company must be a ‘covered financial company’ (defined in § 201(a)(8), 124 Stat 1376, 1443) 
and a written determination must be made by the Secretary of the Treasury (after a recommenda-
tion from the FDIC and the Fed, or in a case involving an insurance company, the Director of the 
Federal Insurance Office and the Fed) that the company presents systemic risk. 
 40 See ibid § 204, 124 Stat 1376, 1454–6. Insurance companies cannot be placed into receivership 
under the Act and must be liquidated or rehabilitated under state law proceedings: § 203(e), 124 
Stat 1376, 1454. 
 41 Ibid § 214, 124 Stat 1376, 1518. 
 42 Ibid § 204(a)(1), 124 Stat 1376, 1454. 
 43 Ibid § 214(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1518. 
 44 Richard J Herring, ‘The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Policy: An 
Application to the Subprime Crisis’ (2009) 26 Yale Journal on Regulation 391, 404. 
 45 Ibid. 
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framework.’46 Taylor argues that the OLA institutionalises a harmful bailout 
process because it is not possible for the FDIC to wind down large and complex 
financial institutions without disruption. He criticises the significant discretion-
ary powers given to the FDIC and suggests the problems of ‘too big to fail’ and 
the political and regulatory capture by certain large financial institutions will 
continue.47 
Wilmarth concludes that the ‘too big to fail’ policy remains ‘the great unre-
solved problem of bank supervision’.48 He suggests the Act makes meaningful 
improvements in the regulation of large financial conglomerates. However, it 
does not solve the ‘too big to fail’ problem because: (i) it relies primarily on 
capital-based regulation, the same supervisory tool that failed to prevent the 
1980s savings and thrift crisis and the GFC; (ii) the efficacy of the supervisory 
reforms depends on the same federal regulatory agencies that failed to stop 
excessive risk-taking during both crises; and (iii) the effectiveness of the FSOC 
is open to question given the history of turf wars and bureaucratic issues that 
have typically been associated with governmental multi-agency oversight bodies 
in the US.49 
The arguments of Skeel, Taylor and Wilmarth are valid. The Fed, the FSOC 
and the FDIC are given broad discretion to supervise and monitor the largest 
financial institutions, leaving the door ajar for regulatory abuse or capture.50 In 
practice, the Fed is only likely to use its powers under § 121(a)(4) to break up a 
systemically important financial institution in extraordinary circumstances.51 
Successful implementation of the OLA provisions will also be difficult, and the 
skill and competency of the regulators will be significantly challenged. Determi-
nations on the appropriate time to positively intervene and break up or assume 
control of a company will involve complex, confronting and intensely political 
 
 46 David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd–Frank Act and Its (Unintended) 
Consequences (John Wiley & Sons, 2011) 9. 
 47 John B Taylor, ‘The Dodd–Frank Financial Fiasco’, The Wall Street Journal (online), 1 July 
2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703426004575338732174405398.html>. 
See also Jeffrey N Gordon and Christopher Muller, ‘Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd–Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund’ (2011) 28 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 151; Kenneth Scott, ‘Dodd–Frank: Resolution or Expropriation?’ (Working Paper, 
Stanford Law School, 25 August 2010). Scott argues that the OLA procedure ‘gives unprece-
dented power and discretion to an administrative official, going far beyond banking law to the 
point of posing serious Constitutional problems’: at 1. He is concerned by the lack of due process 
and judicial overview. 
 48 Arthur E Wilmarth Jr, ‘The Dodd–Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-
To-Fail Problem’ (2011) 89 Oregon Law Review 951, 1052. 
 49 Ibid 1053–4. 
 50 Notably, Mark McDermott suggests the potential harshness of the provisions may mean that the 
‘most salutary effect will be to minimize the circumstances under which it will, in fact, be used.’ 
He argues that the Act’s broad provisions and the power vested in the FDIC may work best when 
used as a threat to compel a private solution: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & 
Affiliates, above n 8, 102. 
 51 Wilmarth, above n 48, 1024–5. Wilmarth highlights that the Fed’s divestiture authority under the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 2006, 12 USC § 1844(e)(1) (2006) has never been successfully 
used for a major banking organisation. He suggests that given the more stringent procedural and 
substantive constraints on the Fed’s authority under § 121, the prospects for a Fed-ordered 
breakup of a systemically important financial institution seem remote at best. 
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decisions.52 If the regulatory agencies take a conservative approach, the break-up 
or winding down of a large firm may occur too late to avoid another major crisis 
with potentially significant economic consequences. Conversely, the premature 
or poorly managed break-up or winding down of an important firm is likely to be 
very costly politically. 
Perhaps the weakest aspect of the reforms in tits I and II is the domestic focus. 
One of the most important lessons from the GFC is the essential interconnected-
ness of global financial markets and systems. The GFC was primarily rooted in 
factors originating in the US, but the drivers of future crises may well arise from 
elsewhere. Many of the largest financial institutions operate outside of the US 
and will not be subject to these provisions. Thus, the Fed, the FSOC and the 
FDIC will need to work closely with global policymakers and regulators to 
ensure the reforms achieve their purposes.53 The efficacy of the provisions and 
processes in tits I and II will only be seen fully during the next financial crisis. 
IV  FI N A N C I A L IN S T I T U T I O N S 
The Dodd–Frank Act extends the breadth of the regulatory framework for 
financial institutions. The primary aims of the extended regulatory oversight are 
to restrict the scope of activity of some financial institutions as a means of 
reducing systemic risk and increasing the transparency of capital market trading. 
A  Legislative Provisions 
1 Insurance Companies 
The insurance regulatory framework in the US is generally state-based. How-
ever, tit V of the Act creates a Federal Insurance Office within Treasury to 
monitor all aspects of the insurance sector.54 The ability of the FSOC to super-
vise an insurance company as a designated NFC under the Act’s reforms also 
 
 52 Dodd–Frank Act, § 203(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1451 indicates that having received a recommenda-
tion, the Secretary in consultation with the President shall appoint the FDIC as receiver of a 
covered financial company if the Secretary determines that: the financial company is in default 
or in danger of default; the failure of the financial company would have serious adverse effects 
on financial stability in the US; no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the 
default; the effect on the claims or interests of creditors, counterparties and shareholders of the 
financial company and other market participants of proceedings under the Act is appropriate, 
given the impact of any action under the Act on financial stability in the US; and an orderly 
liquidation would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects. 
 53 Global discussion and policy development of many of the reform areas in the Dodd–Frank Act 
are continuing. See, eg, G-20, ‘Communiqué of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
of the G-20’ (Communiqué, 14–15 October 2011) [4] <http://www.g20.org/pub_ 
communiques.aspx>, where it was stated that  
[w]e are more determined than ever to reform the financial sector to better serve the needs of 
our economies. We reaffirm our commitment to implement fully, consistently and in a non-
discriminatory way agreed reforms on OTC derivatives, all Basel agreements on banking 
regulation within agreed timelines and reducing overreliance on external credit ratings. We 
endorsed a comprehensive framework to reduce the risks posed by [systemically important 
financial institutions], including strengthened supervision …  
 54 Dodd–Frank Act, § 502, 124 Stat 1376, 1580–9. 
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brings the insurance holding company system within the federal regulatory 
framework. 
2 Depository Institutions 
The Act emphasises the traditional role of banks and saving and loan entities 
as intermediators between depositors and mortgagors. Section 619 prohibits 
depository institutions and their affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading; 
acquiring or retaining an interest in a hedge fund or a private equity fund; or 
sponsoring such a fund.55 These provisions (commonly referred to as the 
‘Volcker Rule’, after former Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker) apply to 
proprietary trading and fund activities by US banks in any location.56 They also 
apply to proprietary trading and fund activities of non-US banks in the US, or 
such activities outside of the US if they involve the offering of securities to US 
residents.57 Designated NFCs are not subject to the Volcker Rule, but they may 
be required to hold additional capital and quantitative limits may be set in 
relation to such activities.58 
‘Proprietary trading’ is broadly defined in the Act as ‘engaging as a principal 
for the trading account of a banking organisation’ or supervised NFC in  
any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any secu-
rity, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any 
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other security or fi-
nancial instrument that the [regulators may determine by rule].59 
In other words, the Volcker Rule generally prohibits a depository institution 
buying and selling securities as principal for the entity’s trading account. 
However, some trading activity is specifically permitted, including: 
• trading in government securities; 
• trading in connection with underwriting or market-making;  
• risk-mitigating hedging; 
• trading on behalf of customers;  
• investments in small business investment companies;  
• trading by a regulated insurance business for the general account of the 
insurance company; and 
• the organising and offering of a private equity or hedge fund.60 
The Act requires the FSOC to study the Volcker Rule and to make recommen-
dations on its implementation.61 The FSOC completed this study and reported to 
 
 55 Ibid § 619, 124 Stat 1376, 1620–31. 
 56 Ibid § 619(d)(1)(H), 124 Stat 1376, 1625. 
 57 Ibid. See also Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates, above n 8, 31. 
 58 Ibid § 619(f)(4), 124 Stat 1376, 1629. 
 59 Ibid § 619(h)(4), 124 Stat 1376, 1630. 
 60 Ibid § 619(d), 124 Stat 1376, 1623–6. 
 61 Ibid § 619(b)(1), 124 Stat 1376, 1621. 
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Congress on 18 January 2011.62 The FSOC report advocated robust implementa-
tion of the Volcker Rule and recommended that the federal regulatory agencies 
consider taking the following actions: 
1 Require banking entities to sell or wind down all impermissible proprietary 
trading desks. 
2 Require banking entities to implement a robust compliance regime, includ-
ing public attestation by the [chief executive officer] of the regime’s effec-
tiveness. 
3 Require banking entities to perform quantitative analysis to detect poten-
tially impermissible proprietary trading without provisions for safe harbors. 
4 Perform supervisory review of trading activity to distinguish permitted 
activities from impermissible proprietary trading. 
5 Require banking entities to implement a mechanism that identifies to 
Agencies which trades are customer-initiated. 
6 Require divestiture of impermissible proprietary trading positions and 
impose penalties when warranted. 
7 Prohibit banking entities from investing in or sponsoring any hedge fund or 
private equity fund, except to bona fide trust, fiduciary or investment advi-
sory customers. 
8 Prohibit banking entities from engaging in transactions that would allow 
them to ‘bail out’ a hedge fund or private equity fund. 
9 Identify ‘similar funds’ that should be brought within the scope of the 
Volcker Rule prohibitions in order to prevent evasion of the intent of the 
rule. 
10 Require banking entities to publicly disclose permitted exposure to hedge 
funds and private equity funds.63 
Timothy Geithner, the Treasury Secretary, who leads the FSOC, indicated that 
‘[w]e have to be careful to strike the right balance between putting in place new 
rules that protect consumers and investors and the economy, without stifling the 
competition and innovation that drives economic growth’.64 
 
 62 FSOC, ‘Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds’ (January 2011) 
<http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/studies-and-reports.aspx>. The FSOC notes that 
‘certain classes of permitted activities — in particular, market making, hedging, underwriting, 
and other transactions on behalf of customers — often evidence outwardly similar characteristics 
to proprietary trading, even as they pursue different objectives’: at 18. Notably, the study con-
cludes that ‘[s]upervisory review is likely to be the ultimate lynchpin in effective implementation 
by Agencies’: at 43. 
 63 Ibid 3. 
 64 Ian Katz and Rebecca Christie, ‘Volcker Rule Should Be “Robust”, Financial Oversight Panel 
Says’, Bloomberg (online), 18 January 2011 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/ 
volcker-rule-s-implementation-should-be-robust-oversight-council-says.html>. 
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3 Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 
Prior to enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act, registered hedge fund advisers 
were subject to the same disclosure requirements as other registered investment 
advisers in the US. Moreover, disclosure and risk management practices at hedge 
funds were acknowledged as having improved over the last decade.65 In practice, 
however, many hedge funds were not registered with the SEC and were not 
required to report their activities,66 because they fell within the safe harbour of 
reg D under the private offering exemption of § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933.67 Most funds were exempt from registration as investment companies 
under §§ 3(c)(1) or (7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as the securities 
were issued as private placements and either there were less than 100 investors 
or the securities were offered to ‘qualified purchasers’.68 Section 203(b)(3) 
exempted advisers from registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
provided there were fewer than 15 clients, no services were offered to the public, 
and no advice was given to registered investment companies.69 
The Dodd–Frank Act requires hedge funds and private equity funds that were 
previously exempt under §§ 3(c)(1) or (7) of the Investment Company Act to 
register with the SEC.70 In addition, the exemption under § 203(b)(3) of the 
Investor Advisers Act has been repealed.71 All advisers to private funds, whether 
registered or not, are required to provide ongoing reports to the SEC.72 
4 Credit Rating Agencies 
Section 931 of the Dodd–Frank Act indicates that Congress found that credit 
rating agencies are ‘central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the 
efficient performance of the United States economy’. The rating agencies ‘play a 
critical “gatekeeper” role in the debt market that is functionally similar to that of 
securities analysts … and auditors.’ Their activities are ‘fundamentally commer-
cial in character and should be subject to the same standards of liability and 
oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and investment bankers’. 
Inaccurate ratings on structured financial products ‘contributed significantly to 
 
 65 For a detailed review of hedge fund regulation and practices prior to the reforms, see GAO, 
Hedge Funds: Regulators and Market Participants Are Taking Steps to Strengthen Market Disci-
pline, but Continued Attention is Needed (Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-08-200, 
January 2008) (‘GAO Hedge Funds’). 
 66 Lisa C Brice, ‘2010 Financial Reform as It Relates to Hedge Funds’ (Working Paper, 19 July 
2010) 3–4 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679191>. 
 67 15 USC § 77(d) (2006). The relevant regulation is 17 CFR § 230.506 (2009). There is no limit on 
the amount of capital raised under r 506 when a company does not market its securities through 
general solicitation or advertising and the securities are sold only to ‘accredited investors’. 
 68 15 USC §§ 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2006). 
 69 15 USC § 80b-3(3) (2006). 
 70 Dodd–Frank Act, § 402, 124 Stat 1376, 1570. Section 408 requires the SEC to provide an 
exemption from the registration requirements for investment advisers with less than $150 million 
in assets under management. This exemption applies only to advisers who act solely as advisers 
to private funds. The SEC is empowered to require annual reporting from the exempted invest-
ment advisers as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors: Dodd–Frank Act, § 408, 124 Stat 1376, 1575. 
 71 Ibid § 403, 124 Stat 1376, 1571. 
 72 Ibid § 404, 124 Stat 1376, 1571–4. 
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the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors … Such 
inaccuracy necessitates increased accountability on the part of credit rating 
agencies’.73 
The Act seeks to minimise conflicts of interest and improve the transparency 
of credit rating processes by imposing disclosure, reporting and procedural 
regulation as well as corporate governance processes. Rating agencies must 
disclose credit rating assumptions, procedures and methodologies; the potential 
limitations of a rating; information on the uncertainty of a rating; the extent to 
which third party services have been used in arriving at a rating; an overall 
assessment of the quality of available and considered information; and informa-
tion relating to conflicts of interest.74 A standardised form must be used to 
disclose the information to enable comparison.75 The SEC is mandated to 
establish a rule requiring agencies to provide published periodic performance 
reports that reveal the accuracy of ratings provided over a range of years and for 
a variety of types of credit ratings.76 
In addition, the agencies must disclose whether and to what extent external due 
diligence services have been used.77 The findings and conclusions of any third 
party due diligence reports must be published and the third party must certify and 
explain the extent of the review performed.78 
The Act specifically provides for private investor actions against a credit rating 
agency under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,79 in the same manner and to 
the same extent as apply to statements made by an accounting firm or a securities 
analyst.80 It also alters the pleading standards under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 199581 so that a complaint need only state facts that 
give rise to a strong inference that the ratings agency knowingly or recklessly 
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts relied on or failed to 
obtain reasonable verification of the factual elements.82 
The Act mandates the SEC to conduct a range of studies on, among other 
issues: 
 
 73 Ibid § 931, 124 Stat 1376, 1872. 
 74 Ibid § 932(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1879–81. 
 75 Ibid § 932(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1879. 
 76 Ibid § 932(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1880. The SEC has issued the following proposed rules: Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization (‘NRSRO’) reports of internal controls; technical 
amendments to NRSRO Rules; transparency of NRSRO ratings performance; credit ratings 
procedures and methodologies; certification by third parties; and fines and other penalties. The 
rules are available at SEC, Implementing Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act — Accomplishments <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml>. 
 77 Dodd–Frank Act, § 404, 124 Stat 1376, 1571–4. 
 78 Ibid § 932(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1880. 
 79 15 USC §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 80 Dodd–Frank Act, § 933(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1883. 
 81 15 USC § 78u-4(2) (2006). 
 82 Dodd–Frank Act, § 933(b)(2), 124 Stat 1376, 1883. On 29 September 2010, the SEC revised 
reg FD to remove the exemption for entities whose primary business is the issuance of credit 
ratings: SEC, ‘Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption for Credit Rating Agencies’ 
(Release, Nos 33-9146 and 34-63003, 29 September 2010) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
2010/33-9146.pdf >. 
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• the standardisation of terminology used by credit rating agencies;83 
• the market stress conditions under which ratings are determined;84 
• the independence of rating organisations;85 
• conflict of interest issues faced by rating agencies;86 and 
• the feasibility of creating an organisation to provide the ratings of struc-
tured finance products.87 
Following the study, a system may be established for the assignment of nation-
ally recognised statistical ratings organisations to determine the credit ratings of 
structured products should this be in the public interest or necessary to protect 
investors.88 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
1 Volcker Rule 
Prior to the GFC, the concept and practical reality of what constituted a bank, a 
non-bank financial institution, an insurance company, a hedge fund, a fund 
manager, a private equity adviser or a broker in the US had become blurred with 
the advent of large financial conglomerates. Significant areas of activity of many 
financial institutions, particularly the largest players, did not fit neatly within the 
jurisdictions of single regulators. Some areas of financial market activity such as 
private equity and over-the-counter (‘OTC’) trading were not generally super-
vised, and some market participants such as credit rating agencies and hedge 
fund advisers were subject to only minimal regulation and oversight. 
The Volcker Rule represents a partial policy reversion to the period between 
1933 and 1999, when the US had the Glass–Steagall restrictions in operation. 
These rules were initially introduced in the Banking Act of 1933,89 which 
generally prohibited: 
• banks from purchasing securities for their own account;90 
• deposit-taking institutions from engaging in the ‘issuing, underwriting, 
selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate partici-
pation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes’ or other securities excepting US 
Treasury bills and other public sector debt;91 
 
 83 Dodd–Frank Act, § 939(h), 124 Stat 1376, 1887. 
 84 Ibid. 
 85 Ibid § 939C, 124 Stat 1376, 1888. 
 86 Ibid § 939F, 124 Stat 1376, 1889. 
 87 Ibid. On 10 May 2011, the SEC requested public input to assist the study on the rating process 
for structured finance products: SEC, ‘Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned 
Credit Ratings’ (Release, No 34-64456, 10 May 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-
frank/accomplishments.shtml>. 
 88 Dodd–Frank Act, § 939F(d), 124 Stat 1376, 1889–90. 
 89 Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162. 
 90 Ibid § 16, 48 Stat 162, 184–5. However, commercial banks were permitted to purchase and sell 
securities on the order of and for the account of customers. 
 91 Ibid §§ 16, 21, 48 Stat 162, 185, 189. 
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• banks from affiliating with a company engaged principally in the ‘issue, 
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or 
through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other 
securities’;92 and 
• banks from having interlocking directorships or close officer or employee 
relationships with a company principally engaged in securities underwrit-
ing and distribution.93 
These rules to effectively separate the businesses of commercial banking and 
investment banking were extended in 1956 by the passing of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956.94 However, restrictions on the integration of banking and 
securities businesses were gradually relaxed from the 1970s, until the Glass–
Steagall measures were formally repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.95 
Some scholars suggest it is surprising that opposition to the repeal of the 
Glass–Steagall restrictions was not more intense.96 However, market and 
financial deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s was strongly supported by most 
policymakers, scholars and members of the judiciary, as well as the finance 
industry. Most of the theories to support the push for increasing deregulation and 
ever larger financial conglomerates were economic or efficiency-based. The 
commonly cited arguments for larger and more integrated global financial 
institutions (or universal banking as it is sometimes called) were scale and 
diversification benefits, and the need to enhance efficiency, spread risk and 
foster innovation. There were critics who warned about the potential concentra-
tion of risk.97 However, these parties rarely expressed their arguments in 
compelling economic terms, and when they did so, their voices were generally 
overwhelmed in the drive for institutional profit, financial sector growth and 
enhanced competitiveness or dominance on the global financial stage. 
The size and scale of financial institutions are not the only factors that have 
changed significantly since the 1980s. The structure of capital markets and 
trading patterns have also undergone a series of transformative phases.98 Market 
activity levels have rapidly escalated, particularly trading in derivative instru-
 
 92 Ibid § 20, 48 Stat 162, 188. 
 93 Ibid § 32, 48 Stat 162, 194. 
 94 Pub L No 84-511, 70 Stat 133. 
 95 Pub L No 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat 1338, 1341 (1999). 
 96 See, eg, Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Reform of “Too-Big-To-Fail” Bank: A New Regulatory Model 
for the Institutional Separation of “Casino” from “Utility” Banking’ (Working Paper, The Uni-
versity of Manchester, 14 February 2010) 13 n 26. 
 97 See, eg, Robert E Litan, ‘Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product Deregula-
tion’ (1985) 3 Yale Journal on Regulation 1. Litan argued at 2 that while  
[i]n theory, product diversification would make it possible for banks to reduce the volatility of 
their earnings … [t]he freedom to diversify … could increase instability in the banking system 
because of the danger that funds raised from insured depositors will be used to support unduly 
risky investments. 
 98 See Gill North, ‘Structural Developments in Global Capital Markets: Promoting Efficiency or a 
Risky and Unstable Mathematical Playground?’ (Working Paper, The University of New South 
Wales, September 2011); Ross Buckley and Gill North, ‘A Financial Transaction Tax: Inefficient 
or Needed Systemic Reform?’ (2012) 43 Georgetown Journal of International Law (forthcom-
ing). 
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ments.99 An increasing proportion of this activity is computer-generated ‘high 
frequency’ trading.100 Mary Schapiro, the Chairperson of the SEC, recently 
testified that 
proprietary trading firms play a dominant role by providing liquidity through 
the use of highly sophisticated trading systems capable of submitting many 
thousands of orders in a single second. These high frequency trading firms can 
generate more than a million trades in a single day and now account for more 
than 50 percent of equity market volume.101 
It is never easy, and often not possible, to turn the clock back. Institutions will 
look for ways to continue intensive principal-based trading under the new 
regime. The extent to which the Volcker Rule affects trading activity in the US 
and reduces actual and potential systemic risk will depend on how the provisions 
are interpreted and enforced by the regulators and judiciary. The regulators are 
being asked to tread a fine line. The initial step of defining ‘proprietary trading’ 
is difficult enough. Implementing and monitoring the Volcker Rule across 
varying markets, assets and institutions, in an environment subject to constant 
change, will be even more challenging.102 
The broader impacts of the trading restrictions are uncertain. Ultimately, the 
Volcker Rule is only likely to be effective if it is adopted as a global strategy. If 
other major markets fail to adopt and enforce equivalent rules, institutions are 
likely to take advantage of gaps or weaknesses in the provisions and regulatory 
frameworks to move their trading to areas where proprietary trading is not 
restricted or oversight is limited. 
 
 99 See, eg, Stephan Schulmeister, ‘A General Financial Transaction Tax: A Short Cut of the Pros, 
the Cons and a Proposal’ (WIFO Working Paper No 344, Österreichisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung [Austrian Institute of Economic Research], October 2009) 5; Zsolt Darvas 
and Jakob von Weizsäcker, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: Small Is Beautiful’ (PE 429.989, Policy 
Department, Economic and Scientific Policies, European Parliament, January 2010) 5–8. 
100 Thornton Matheson, ‘Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence’ (Working Paper 
No 11/54, IMF, March 2011) 19; Sony Kapoor, ‘Financial Transaction Taxes: Tools for Progres-
sive Taxation and Improving Market Behaviour’ (Policy Brief, Re-Define, February 2010) 6. 
Matheson indicates that 10–20 per cent of foreign exchange trading volume, 20 per cent of 
options trading volume and 40 per cent of futures trading volume in the US is algorithmic or 
computer-based. 
101 Mary L Schapiro, ‘Testimony on US Equity Market Structure by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission’ (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of 
the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 8 December 2010). 
102 The proposed Volcker Rule implementing prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading 
under Dodd–Frank Act, § 619, 124 Stat 1376, 1620 was released by the SEC, FDIC, the Fed and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on 12 October 2011: see SEC, ‘SEC Jointly Pro-
poses Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading’ (Press Release, No 204, 12 October 
2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-204.htm>. Consultation on the proposed Rule 
is planned until January 2012. For further discussion, see Charles K Whitehead, ‘The Volcker 
Rule and Evolving Financial Markets’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law Review 39, 69–72; 
cf Matthias Rieker, ‘Citigroup’s Vikram Pandit: Volcker Rule May Strike the Right Balance’, The 
Wall Street Journal (online), 12 October 2011 <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/12/ 
citigroups-vikram-pandit-volcker-rule-may-strike-the-right-balance/>. Vikram Pandit, the Chief 
Executive of Citigroup, suggests the proposed Volcker Rule may strike the right balance between 
speculation and capital. Whitehead suggests the Volcker Rule fails to reflect important shifts in 
the financial markets. He argues for a narrow definition of proprietary trading and a fluid ap-
proach to implementing the Rule. 
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2 The Hedge Fund Provisions 
The benefits and risks posed by hedge funds and the case for more regulation 
of the hedge fund industry continue to be hotly debated. No evidence has been 
found suggesting that hedge funds were a direct cause of the GFC. However, as 
Eichengreen and Mathieson highlight, each crisis or episode of volatility in 
financial markets brings the role played by the hedge fund industry in financial 
market dynamics to the fore.103 Hedge funds were implicated in the 1992 
currency crisis in Europe. Similarly, there were allegations of large hedge fund 
transactions in various Asian currency markets in the lead up to, and in the wake 
of, the Asian financial crisis in 1997. These concerns were compounded by the 
near collapse of a major hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, in the 
US104 and more recent problems with hedge funds tied to subprime mortgages. 
The absolute level of global trading by hedge funds continues to grow, repre-
senting an increasing share of total market trading.105 Many hedge funds trade 
primarily in derivative instruments, which ‘compounds problems of information 
and evaluation for bank management and supervisors alike’.106 These issues are 
accentuated when considered in the context of a globalised market. It is therefore 
important that hedge fund activities are encompassed within the regulatory 
structure to allow supervisors a comprehensive overview of markets.107 
3 The Rating Agency Provisions 
Some scholars argued prior to the GFC that rating agencies were sufficiently 
motivated ‘to provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is 
directly tied to reputation.’108 Schwarcz concluded that ‘public regulation of 
ratings agencies [was] an unnecessary and potentially costly policy option.’109 
 
103 Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson, ‘Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?’ 
(Economic Issues No 19, IMF, September 1999) 8–9. See also Nicole M Boyson, Christof W 
Stahel and Renè M Stulz, ‘Hedge Fund Contagion and Liquidity Shocks’ (2010) 65 Journal of 
Finance 1789, where it is argued that contagion in the hedge fund industry is linked to liquidity 
shocks. 
104 Eichengreen and Mathieson, above n 103, 9–10. 
105 Kapoor, above n 100, 7. Kapoor suggests that hedge funds account for 90 per cent of the trading 
volume in convertible bonds, 55–60 per cent of the transaction in leveraged loans, almost 90 per 
cent of the trading in distressed debt, and more than 60 per cent of the trading volume in the 
credit default swap market. 
106 Eichengreen and Mathieson, above n 103, 8; GAO Hedge Funds, above n 65, 19. These problems 
would also arise for investors more generally. 
107 FSOC, 2011 Annual Report, above n 36, 69. The FSOC report indicates that historically 
‘regulators have had little reliable, detailed information regarding the activities of any particular 
hedge fund or hedge funds in general, which is of concern because of their increased role in the 
financial system.’ See also International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Methodology 
for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ 
(Final Report 08/11, September 2011). The IOSCO report indicates that hedge funds may ‘pose a 
number of risks to market integrity, investor protection and financial stability.’ These risks are 
‘magnified when financial markets are suffering from stress or instability’ because hedge funds 
often use ‘leverage and … the concentrated unwinding of their positions could cause major 
dislocation and potential disorderly pricing of markets.’ The report concludes that these potential 
risks need to be mitigated through appropriate oversight: at 138–9. 
108 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox’ (2002) 1 
University of Illinois Law Review 1, 26. 
109 Ibid 2. 
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However, the public listing of a ratings company results in an inherent conflict 
between the managerial incentive to provide paying clients with their desired 
ratings, and to thereby increase the level of ratings provided and company 
profits, and the public interest that requires accurate ratings. 
Listokin and Taibleson propose an incentive scheme in which ratings are paid 
for with the debt rated.110 This proposal is novel and interesting, but is unlikely 
to be acceptable to the agencies because it would make their financial manage-
ment very difficult. Hunt argues that the ‘incentive problem can be corrected by 
requiring an agency to disgorge profits on ratings that are revealed to be of low 
quality by the performance of the product type over time, unless the agency 
discloses that the ratings are of low quality.’111 This approach poses significant 
implementation issues. It is not clear who would make the ex post facto judg-
ments on the quality of the ratings. There may be a range of factors resulting in 
poor performance that were not reasonably foreseeable by the rating agencies. 
Moreover, even when issues associated with the rating quality could be directly 
linked to the agency, a disgorgement of the agency profit after the event would 
not assist investors who had suffered damage arising from the poor quality 
rating.112  
Coffee suggests that analysis of the reforms relating to credit rating agencies 
requires acknowledgement of ‘[t]hree simple truths’: 
First, an ‘issuer pays’ business model invites the sacrifice of reputational capital 
in return for high current revenues. 
Second, competition is good, except when it is bad. When [credit rating agen-
cies] compete for the favour of issuers, rather than for that of investors, ratings 
arbitrage results. … 
Third, in a bubbly market, no one, including investors, may have a strong inter-
est in learning the truth.’113 
He concludes that ‘[o]nly a strong and highly motivated watchdog can offset 
this process of repression and self-delusion.’114 Coffee argues that reform that 
fails to address the ‘issuer pays’ business model ‘amounts to re-arranging the 
deck chairs on the Titanic, while ignoring the gaping hole created by the ice-
berg.’115 He emphasises the importance of getting the regulation right and 
suggests that it is necessary to encourage a ‘subscriber pays’ model to compete 
with the ‘issuer pays’ model.116 A mandated ‘subscriber pays’ model is worthy of 
 
110 Yair Listokin and Benjamin Taibleson, ‘If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating 
Accuracy through Incentive Compensation’ (2010) 27 Yale Journal on Regulation 91. 
111 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of 
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement’ [2009] Columbia 
Business Law Review 109, 112. 
112 See John C Coffee Jr, ‘Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’ (Law Working Paper 
No 162/2010, European Corporate Governance Institute, September 2010) 28. 
113 Ibid 52–3. 
114 Ibid 53. 
115 Ibid 58. 
116 Ibid 33. Coffee defines the ‘subscriber pays’ model as one that requires institutional investors to 
obtain their own ratings from a ratings agency not retained by the issuer or underwriter before 
they purchase the debt securities. 
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further consideration, as the reforms included in the Dodd–Frank Act, which 
predominantly rely on disclosure rules, may not be adequate to address the 
strong temptation for agencies to prefer short-term profits over longer-term 
reputational issues.117 
Finally, there are questions around the constitutionality of the provisions 
enabling private investor actions against credit rating agencies. Litigation against 
the rating agencies has generally been unsuccessful in the US because the courts 
have upheld the agencies’ claim for protection under the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, on the basis that their ratings are statements of 
opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold 
any securities.118 
V  CA P I TA L MA R K E T S  A N D  PR O D U C T S 
A  Legislative Provisions 
1 Securitisation 
The Dodd–Frank Act seeks to enhance the accountability and diligence of 
parties issuing or originating asset-backed securities (‘ABS’) by requiring them 
to retain some of the credit risk (to keep some ‘skin in the game’). The retained 
risk may not be hedged or transferred.119  
The required risk retention is a minimum of five per cent.120 However, assets 
that are not subject to the retained risk requirement include securitisation of 
‘qualified residential mortgages’, securitisation of federally guaranteed mortgage 
loans, and other assets issued or guaranteed by the US and its agencies.121 These 
provisions are a good example of the incomplete nature of this legislation, as the 
definition and standards of a ‘qualified’ residential mortgage are to be deter-
mined by the federal banking agencies, the SEC, the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.122 
An issuer of ABS must disclose asset or loan-level data on the identity of 
brokers or originators of the assets, the details of the compensation of the broker 
or originator of the assets backing the security, and the amount of risk retained if 
 
117 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, above n 13, 207. The Commission cites a statement by 
Jerome Fons, a former managing director of Moody’s Investor Services, to the FDIC on 22 April 
2010 that the 
main problem was … that the firm became so focused, particularly the structured area, on 
revenues, on market share, and the ambitions of Brian Clarkson, [former President of Moody’s 
Investor Services,] that they willingly looked the other way, [and] traded the firm’s reputation 
for short-term profits. 
118 Ibid 120. 
119 Dodd–Frank Act, § 941(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1891. In March 2011, the regulators jointly issued 
proposed rules regarding risk retention by securitisers of ABS: SEC, ‘Agencies Seek Public 
Comment on Risk Retention Proposal’ (Press Release, No 79, 31 March 2011) 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-79.htm>. 
120 Dodd–Frank Act, § 941(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1891–2. 
121 Ibid § 941(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1894–5. 
122 Ibid § 941(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1895. 
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this is required for investors to carry out independent due diligence.123 ABS 
credit ratings must provide a description of the representations, warranties and 
enforcement mechanisms and how they differ from issuances of similar securi-
ties.124 Disclosure of fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests is required so 
that investors can identify underwriting deficiencies.125 The Act mandates the 
SEC to issue rules requiring issuers of ABS to conduct a review of the underly-
ing assets and to disclose the outcome to investors.126 
2 Derivatives and Swap Trading 
Title VII of the Act, entitled ‘Wall Street Transparency and Accountability’, 
extends regulatory oversight to OTC derivatives and markets. The new regime 
encompasses commodity swaps, interest rate swaps, total return swaps and credit 
default swaps. The CFTC is responsible for regulating swaps,127 while the SEC 
is responsible for the regulation of security-based swaps,128 with the definitions 
of ‘swaps’ and ‘security-based swaps’ leaving ambiguities that will need to be 
resolved.129 Foreign exchange products other than spot and exchange-traded 
contracts will be subject to CFTC-supervised regulation.130 Any security-based 
swap that contains an interest rate, currency or commodity component will be 
subject to regulation by both the CFTC and SEC, in consultation with the Fed.131  
The purposes of the reforms are to ‘increase regulatory and public transpar-
ency, reduce counterparty risk, and enhance the resiliency of the swaps mar-
kets.’132 The mechanisms adopted to achieve these goals are: 
• to require most products to be centrally cleared and traded on ex-
changes;133 
• to subject swap dealers and major participants to capital and margin re-
quirements;134 and 
 
123 Dodd–Frank Act, § 942(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1897. For comprehensive analysis of loan-level 
disclosure, see Howell E Jackson, ‘Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A 
Problem with Three Dimensions’ (Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No 10-40, Har-
vard Law School, 27 July 2010). Jackson concludes that with a few modest refinements, loan-
level disclosures could revolutionise the manner in which mortgage originations in the US are 
policed: at 23. 
124 Dodd–Frank Act, § 943(1), 124 Stat 1376, 1897. The SEC has adopted new rules relating to 
representation and warranties in asset-based securities offerings: 17 CFR §§ 229, 232, 240, 249 
(2011). See also SEC, ‘Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’ (Release, No 33-9175, 
20 January 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9175.pdf >. 
125 Dodd–Frank Act, § 943(2), 124 Stat 1376, 1897. 
126 Ibid § 945, 124 Stat 1376, 1898. 
127 Ibid § 712, 124 Stat 1376, 1641–6. 
128 Ibid § 764, 124 Stat 1376, 1784–5. 
129 Ibid §§ 721(a)(19), (21), 124 Stat 1376, 1665–6, 1666–70. In April 2011, the SEC and CFTC 
issued proposed swap definitions for public comment: SEC, ‘SEC Proposes Product Definitions 
for Swaps’ (Press Release, No 99, 27 April 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
99.htm>. 
130 Dodd–Frank Act, § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat 1376, 1666–8. 
131 Ibid. 
132 FSOC, 2011 Annual Report, above n 36, 118. 
133 Dodd–Frank Act, § 723, 124 Stat 1376, 1675–6. 
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• to require real-time public reporting of transaction and pricing data of 
cleared and uncleared swaps.135 
The Act requires the SEC and the CFTC to establish detailed mandatory clear-
ing processes, business conduct standards, and capital and margin requirements. 
The Act empowers the CFTC and SEC to clear a swap or to require designated 
swaps to be cleared.136 This means that swaps that are subject to mandatory 
clearing requirements, but which clearing houses determine are not eligible for 
clearing, will effectively be prohibited. A swap is exempt from the clearing and 
exchange trading requirements if one of the counterparties is an end user that is 
hedging commercial risk. However, the exemption only applies to a counterparty 
that is not a financial entity, that is using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial 
risk, and that notifies the SEC as to how it generally satisfies its swap-related 
financial obligations.137 The CFTC and SEC are required to create rules to 
mitigate conflicts of interests arising from control of clearing houses, exchanges 
and swap facilities by industry participants.138 
All swap dealers and major swap participants are subject to risk-based capital 
requirements.139 In addition, the Act provides the CFTC with powers to impose 
aggregate position limits across markets in order to: 
• diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation; 
• deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes and corners; 
• ensure sufficient liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and 
• ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying market is not 
disrupted.140 
Similarly, the SEC may establish size limits on individual or aggregate swap 
positions as a means to prevent fraud and manipulation.141 
The SEC is mandated to adopt business conduct standards requiring swap 
dealers and participants to disclose material risks and characteristics of a swap, 
material incentives or conflicts of interest, and mark-to-market information.142 
Swap dealers or major participants will be required under the standards to 
‘communicate in a fair and balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing 
 
134 Ibid § 731(2), 124 Stat 1376, 1705–6. 
135 Ibid §§ 727, 729, 124 Stat 1376, 1696–7, 1701–3. 
136 Ibid § 723(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1675–81. 
137 Ibid § 723(a)(7), 124 Stat 1376, 1679–80. 
138 Ibid §§ 726, 728, 124 Stat 1376, 1695–6, 1697–701. The SEC has issued a series of proposed 
rules relating to derivatives: SEC, ‘SEC Proposes Rules for Registration of Securities-Based 
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants’ (Press Release, No 205, 12 October 
2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-205.htm>. The CFTC has also issued a series 
of proposed and final rules on clearing and trade execution and swap-related regulation: see 
CFTC, Dodd–Frank Proposed Rules <http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ 
Dodd-FrankProposedRules/index.htm>; CFTC, Dodd–Frank Final Rules <http://www.cftc.gov/ 
LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinalRules/index.htm>. 
139 Dodd–Frank Act, § 731, 124 Stat 1376, 1705–6. 
140 Ibid § 737, 124 Stat 1376, 1722–6. Rules that limit the size of positions in futures and swaps 
markets have been finalised by the CFTC: see 17 CFR §§ 150–1. 
141 Dodd–Frank Act, § 763(h), 124 Stat 1376, 1778. 
142 Ibid § 731(h), 124 Stat 1376, 1707–8. 
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and good faith’.143 When advising special entities such as municipalities and 
pension plans, swap dealers have a duty to act in the best interests of the special 
entity.144 
3 Payment, Clearing and Settlement Activities 
The Act provides for the supervision of systemically important financial mar-
ket utilities and payment, and of clearing and settlement activities conducted by 
financial institutions. The CFTC and the SEC are required to enact regulations in 
consultation with the FSOC and the Fed containing risk management standards 
for designated utilities and activities.145 The standards to be considered include: 
• risk management policies and procedures; 
• margin and collateral requirements; 
• participant or counterparty default policies and procedures;  
• the ability to complete timely clearing and settlement of financial transac-
tions; and  
• capital and financial resource requirements.146 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
The Act does not prohibit or limit specific types of derivative instruments such 
as the synthetic collateralised debt obligations that attracted much adverse 
comment in the aftermath of the GFC.147 Instead, the CFTC and SEC are 
empowered to report on any instruments that may undermine the stability of a 
financial market or have adverse consequences for participants in the market.148 
This approach acknowledges that capital markets are constantly evolving, and 
that to be effective, regulation and regulatory responses must adapt to changing 
conditions and product innovation. The legislative reforms will only be meaning-
ful if they deter or mitigate the fallout from the next financial crisis, which will 
almost certainly centre on different products and circumstances than those 
leading up to the GFC. 
The intended effect of the swap-related provisions appears to be to encourage 
standard or ‘vanilla-type’ swaps that are cleared through an exchange and 
clearing house in order to improve systemic oversight. Clearing houses generally 
 
143 Ibid § 731(h)(3)(C), 124 Stat 1376, 1708. 
144 Ibid §§ 731(h)(2), (4), 124 Stat 1376, 1708–9. 
145 Ibid § 805(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat 1376, 1809. In March 2011 the SEC issued proposed rules 
regarding systemically important clearing agencies: SEC, ‘Clearing Agency Standards for Opera-
tion and Governance’ (Release, No 34-64017, 3 March 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/2011/34-64017.pdf >. In July 2011, the SEC, CFTC and the Federal Reserve 
Board reported to Congress on the framework for designated clearing entity risk management: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, SEC and CFTC, Risk Management Supervi-
sion of Designated Clearing Entities (2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/813 
study.pdf >. 
146 Dodd–Frank Act, § 805(c), 124 Stat 1376, 1810. 
147 For an outline of collaterised debt obligations and credit default swaps developments prior to the 
GFC, see FSOC, 2011 Annual Report, above n 36, 25–7. 
148 Dodd–Frank Act, § 714, 124 Stat 1376, 1647. 
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manage default risk by offsetting transactions, by collection of an upfront margin 
on trades that serves as a reserve in the event of default by a member, and 
through the establishment of a guarantee fund to cover losses that exceed the 
margin collected. On products such as swaps and commodities, the collateral 
generally includes an ongoing variation margin. The Act adopts aspects of the 
clearing house risk model by requiring payments from swap counterparties in the 
OTC markets. The collateral, margin and disclosure requirements are likely to 
promote greater use of standardised structured products and vehicles and 
discourage more complex and highly leveraged structures. 
Many parties have argued for greater transparency in post-GFC securitisation 
and derivative markets.149 Some argue that the reforms do not go far enough. For 
instance, critics suggest that naked credit default swaps should be banned.150 
Others suggest the provision exceptions may be too broad, and that as a conse-
quence a large portion of the derivative trading may continue unhindered.151 
Skeel concludes that despite the ‘substantial uncertainties’ in the legislation, the 
‘new framework for clearing derivatives and trading them on exchanges is an 
unequivocal advance.’152 We agree. The reforms may improve the operation of 
markets and enhance long-term economic efficiency. When trades are cleared 
through clearing houses, the risk of default is independently managed and 
minimised. The level and overall share of derivative trading through exchanges 
is likely to increase, facilitating greater market transparency and regulatory 
scrutiny. Global supervisors need ready and regular access to derivative trading 
positions to understand capital market developments and to determine systemic 
risks. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in monitoring global system and market 
risk should not be underestimated. Securities trading in the US is highly frag-
mented across many exchanges, electronic communication networks and broker-
dealers. Orders ‘executed in non-public trading venues such as dark pools and 
internalising broker-dealers now account for nearly 30 percent of volume’.153 
The increasing prevalence of high frequency trading through direct access 
market providers makes it difficult and time-consuming for regulators to identify 
trades and the traders involved. The reporting of trading activity even within the 
US ‘often has format, compatibility and clock-synchronization differences’.154 
These issues are significantly compounded when trying to determine global 
exposures. Regulators are improving their systems and audit trails in an endeav-
 
149 See, eg, Hubbard, above n 16, 1; Carlos Tavares, Short Selling and OTC Derivatives Policy 
Options (9 January 2011) VoxEU <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5996>. 
150 See, eg, Tavares, above n 149. 
151 See, eg, Lynn A Stout, ‘Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis’ (2011) 1 
Harvard Business Law Review 1. Stout argues that the credit crisis was primarily due to the 
enactment of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 USC § 1 (2000), which 
removed long-established legal constraints on speculative trading in OTC derivatives. She is 
concerned that tit VII of the Dodd–Frank Act is subject to possible exemptions that may limit its 
effectiveness: at 31–5. 
152 Skeel, above n 46, 14. 
153 Schapiro, ‘Testimony on US Equity Market Structure’, above n 101. 
154 Ibid. 
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our to better monitor trading activity and market developments, but the continu-
ing rapid growth of global trading activity makes this an ongoing challenge.155 
VI   EX E C U T I V E  CO M P E N S AT I O N 
A  Legislative Provisions 
The Dodd–Frank Act reforms seek to address public concerns about compen-
sation paid to company executives, particularly to managers of financial institu-
tions. The Act requires enhanced disclosure of and accountability for compensa-
tion paid to executives of listed companies. Shareholders are provided with a 
non-binding vote on some executive compensation matters including ongoing 
executive packages and golden parachutes.156 Companies must explain the basis 
of the relationship between executive compensation and financial perform-
ance,157 and disclose the ratio of the compensation of the chief executive to 
employee compensation.158 In addition, incentive-based compensation paid to 
executives may be clawed back when financial reporting is found to be materi-
ally noncompliant with the securities laws.159 
The more controversial provisions are contained in § 956 of the Act. These 
provisions require the regulators to enact regulations prohibiting certain incen-
tive-based compensation packages for executives or directors of bank holding 
companies and other ‘covered financial companies’.160 The regulators must issue 
regulations 
that prohibit any types of incentive-based payment arrangement … that the 
regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered financial 
institutions —  
 (1) by providing an executive officer, employee, director, or principal share-
holder of the covered financial institution with excessive compensation, 
fees, or benefits; or 
 
155 See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Report on OTC Derivatives Data Reporting and 
Aggregation Requirements’ (Consultative Report, August 2011) 26–7. The report confirms that 
there is an international effort underway to promote a consistent international framework for the 
regulation of OTC derivatives transactions based on cooperation between national authorities. 
This framework includes efforts to aggregate OTC derivatives data. 
156 Dodd–Frank Act, § 951, 124 Stat 1376, 1899–1900. New rules concerning shareholder approval 
of executive compensation and golden parachute compensation under § 951 were adopted by the 
SEC in January 2011: 17 CFR §§ 229, 240, 249 (2011). See also SEC, ‘Shareholder Approval of 
Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation’ (Release, No 33-9178, 
25 January 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf >. 
157 Dodd–Frank Act, § 953(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1903–4. 
158 Ibid § 953(b)(1), 124 Stat 1376, 1904. 
159 Ibid § 954, 124 Stat 1376, 1904. 
160 For the definition of ‘covered financial institution’, see ibid § 956(e)(2), 124 Stat 1376, 1906. 
Covered financial institutions with assets of less than US$1 billion are exempted from these 
provisions: § 956(f), 124 Stat 1376, 1906. 
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 (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institu-
tion.161 
The Fed, the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘OCC’), 
which issued joint guidelines on executive remuneration in June 2010, will 
monitor compensation paid to bankers in the US. The regulators are also 
reviewing incentive practices at large financial institutions.162 
Notably, the Act provides that the employment of management responsible for 
the financial condition of a failing covered financial company be terminated.163 
The Act also requires that ‘management, directors, and third parties having 
responsibility for the condition of the financial company bear losses consistent 
with their responsibility’.164 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
The legislators clearly want to be seen to give regulators the ability to hold 
individuals who have presided over the collapse of financial companies person-
ally liable for some of the losses. However, the goals to potentially claw back 
some of the compensation paid to managers, directors and third parties of failed 
covered financial companies and to seek reimbursement of some of the losses 
borne165 may be difficult to achieve in practice. 
The likely outcomes of § 956 of the Act are also uncertain. The section prohib-
its any incentive-based compensation arrangement that (i) encourages inappro-
priate risk-taking by providing excessive compensation to staff; or (ii) encour-
ages inappropriate risk-taking that could lead to material financial loss for the 
institution. Accordingly, incentive-based compensation that is not excessive is 
still prohibited if it could lead to risks being taken that are sufficient to cause 
material losses. It will be interesting to see how the final rules define ‘excessive’ 
compensation and how the regulators will interpret compensation arrangements 
that (while not necessarily excessive) still encourage material and inappropriate 
risk-taking. 
At a global level, the G-20 Finance Ministers backed away from a joint pledge 
to cap bank bonuses in 2009.166 However, on 8 July 2010 the European Parlia-
ment passed legislation limiting bonuses at banks, hedge funds and other 
 
161 Ibid § 956(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1905. 
162 On 30 March 2011, the Fed issued a joint proposed rule with the OCC, the FDIC, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union Administration, the SEC and the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency to prohibit incentive-based compensation arrangements that encourage inappro-
priate risk-taking by covered financial companies, and to require the disclosure and reporting of 
certain incentive-based compensation information by covered financial companies: ‘Incentive-
Based Compensation Arrangements’ (Release, No 34-64140, 30 March 2011) 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64140.pdf >. 
163 Dodd–Frank Act, § 206(4), 124 Stat 1376, 1459. 
164 Ibid § 204(a)(3), 124 Stat 1376, 1454. 
165 See ibid. 
166 Ashley Seager and Toby Helm, ‘Brown Wins G20 Battle against Caps on Bank Bonuses’, The 
Observer (online), 6 September 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/06/brown-
halts-bonus-caps>. 
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financial institutions.167 The new rules, which took effect from the beginning of 
2011, require bonuses to be structured on a long-term basis, with restrictions on 
upfront cash bonuses, requirements to withhold at least 50 per cent of total 
bonuses for a period contingent on long-term investment performance, and strict 
limits on compensation paid to the executives of institutions that were bailed out 
or supported using taxpayer monies.168 Some financial institutions are pre-
empting a similar move in the US and are deferring more than 50 per cent of the 
bonuses awarded.169 
VII   CO N S U M E R  PR O T E C T I O N 
A  Legislative Provisions 
Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act, called the Consumer Financial Protection Act 
of 2010, creates and empowers a new and independent Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (‘CFPB’) to develop consumer protection rules.170 The 
purpose of the CFPB is to 
seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial 
law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to 
markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for 
[these] products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.171 
The definition of consumer financial products or services is broad, and in-
cludes credit cards, mortgages, credit bureaus, debt collection, and any product 
except insurance that a bank or financial holding company provides to consum-
ers.172 
The Act provides the CFPB with powers to issue regulations, examine compli-
ance and take enforcement action under federal financial consumer laws.173 The 
CFPB has broad authority over depository institutions with assets in excess of 
US$10 billion, financial institutions that broker, originate or service mortgage 
loans, and other large participants that market consumer financial services.174 
 
167 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards Capital Requirements for the 
Trading Book and for Re-Securitisations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies 
[2010] OJ L 329/3 (‘Directive 2010/76/EU’). Cf European Parliament Resolution of 7 July 2010 
on Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies and Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Services Sector (2010/2009(INI)) [2011] OJ C 351 E/08. 
168 Directive 2010/76/EU [2010] OJ L 329/3. See also Karen Maley, ‘The War on Bank Bonuses’, 
Business Spectator (online), 13 July 2010 <http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/ 
Banks-Bonu-European-Union-Financial-Crisis-US-pd20100712-7A9S3?OpenDocument>. 
169 See Jessica Holzer, ‘SEC Puts Forth Bonus Curbs’, The Wall Street Journal (New York), 3 March 
2011, C2; Justin Baer and Francesco Guerrera, ‘Morgan Stanley Defers 60% of Bonuses’, 
Financial Times (London), 21 January 2011, 15. 
170 Dodd–Frank Act, §§ 1011–12, 124 Stat 1376, 1964–6. 
171 Ibid § 1021(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1979–80. 
172 Ibid §§ 1002(5), 1002(15), 124 Stat 1376, 1956, 1957–60. 
173 Ibid §§ 1002(12), 1022(a)–(c), 124 Stat 1376, 1957, 1980–4. 
174 Ibid §§ 1024–6, 124 Stat 1376, 1987–95. 
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The CFPB may prevent these institutions from engaging in unfair, deceptive or 
abusive practices in the provision of consumer financial products and services.175 
The CFPB encompasses a research unit to monitor trends in the provision of 
consumer financial products, a unit to focus on consumer education, and a 
centralised unit to collect and track complaints.176 The Act also establishes an 
Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity,177 an Office of Financial Educa-
tion,178 and an Office of Service Member Affairs.179 
The Act aims to significantly strengthen mortgagee rights and protections. 
Title XIV of the Act, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 
2010, imposes new mortgage underwriting standards, prohibits or restricts 
specified mortgage lending practices and regulates payments to mortgage loan 
officers and brokers. Lenders are banned from steering consumers into high-cost, 
unaffordable loans.180 Lenders must verify a borrower’s ability to repay the 
mortgage in its entirety by reference to specified factors such as the borrower’s 
credit history, employment status, income and debt-to-income ratio.181 A 
borrower may raise a violation of these standards as a foreclosure defence.182 
However, there are safe harbour provisions relating to ‘qualified mortgages’ that 
meet specified criteria, including points and fees of less than three per cent of the 
total new loan amount.183 In addition, intermediaries of mortgage refinancings 
must be able to show that borrowers are better off as a result of a refinancing. To 
better align intermediaries’ incentives with those of their clients, compensation 
payments based on interest rate premiums (commonly referred to as ‘yield 
spread premiums’) or other terms of the loans other than the amount of the 
principal are prohibited.184 Penalty provisions relating to prepayments of certain 
loans are also disallowed.185 Notable enhancements to the mortgage disclosure 
rules include mandatory notice of resets of the interest rate and negative amorti-
sation occurrences.186 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
The development of consumer credit law in the US has a chequered history 
that is closely aligned to the property boom and bust cycles and changes in the 
 
175 Ibid § 1031, 124 Stat 1376, 2005–6. 
176 Ibid § 1013(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1968–70. 
177 Ibid § 1013(c), 124 Stat 1376, 1970. 
178 Ibid § 1013(d), 124 Stat 1376, 1970–2. 
179 Ibid § 1013(e), 124 Stat 1376, 1972. 
180 Ibid § 1403, 124 Stat 1376, 2140. 
181 Ibid § 1411(a)(2), 124 Stat 1376, 2142–3. 
182 Ibid § 1413, 124 Stat 1376, 2148–9. 
183 Ibid § 1412, 124 Stat 1376, 2145–8. 
184 Ibid § 1403, 124 Stat 1376, 2139. 
185 Ibid § 1414(a), 124 Stat 1376, 2149. 
186 Ibid §§ 1032(a), 1414, 1418, 1420, 124 Stat 1376, 2006–7, 2150–1, 2153–4, 2155–6. 
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institutional and product structures.187 Until the 1970s, savings and loans entities 
(‘SLEs’) were the major providers of mortgage credit. However, as the securiti-
sation markets grew, the SLEs lost market share to mortgage companies with 
access to cheaper funds. Financial deregulation shifted the mortgage industry to 
a predominantly national system, with mortgages provided on an originate-to-
distribute model from mortgagee companies that were generally unregulated.188 
During the 1980s and 1990s, consumer advocates highlighted issues around 
predatory and high-cost lending and were successful in achieving some policy 
change.189 However, there was intense lobbying from the finance industry 
opposing a strengthening of the consumer protection laws.190 Continuing 
problems with predatory lending resulted in a series of federal policy reviews. In 
2000, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and the US 
Treasury Department issued a report recommending that the Fed use its authority 
under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (‘HOEPA’)191 
more forcefully to deter predatory practices.192 However, despite continued 
reviews and warnings from many quarters about the dangers of subprime loans 
and the increasing use of complex loan structures, lending regulation at a federal 
level was not substantially changed.193 Conflicts between state and federal 
regulators increased as federal regulators used their pre-emption powers to 
override enhancements to state mortgage regulation.194 In 2007 the legitimacy of 
the pre-emption authority was tested in the Supreme Court in Watters v Wachovia 
 
187 For a detailed historical outline, see Daniel Immergluck, ‘Private Risk, Public Risk: Public 
Policy, Market Development, and the Mortgage Crisis’ (2009) 36 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
447. 
188 Ibid 465–6. Enactment of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 USC 
§§ 3801–5 (2006) enabled the mortgage companies that were subject to state-based regulation to 
opt for supervision by the federal regulator. 
189 See, eg, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-325, 108 Stat 
2160, 2190, which required greater disclosure of high-priced loans and prohibited some loan 
practices and terms. 
190 Industry opposition to new regulation governing mortgage lending was most visible at the state 
level. State legislators were often pressured to repeal or to weaken proposed policy by industry 
lobbyists arguing that regulation would reduce economic development: see Immergluck, above 
n 187, 471–5. 
191 Pub L No 103-325, §§ 151–8, 108 Stat 2160, 2190–8. See 15 US § 1639(l)(2)(b), which states 
that ‘[t]he Board, by regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or practices in connection with … 
refinancing of mortgage loans that the Board finds to be associated with abusive lending prac-
tices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.’ 
192 US Department of Treasury and US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Curbing 
Predatory Home Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report (2000). 
193 Those opposed to stronger regulation argued that the existing lending laws were resulting in 
suboptimal economic outcomes. For instance, a paper submitted to the OCC relied on an indus-
try-funded report which found that the number of subprime loans had declined in North Carolina 
as a result of the passing of anti-predatory lending regulation: see, eg, OCC, ‘Economic Issues in 
Predatory Lending’ (Working Paper, 30 July 2003) 2. 
194 For instance, in 2003 Eliot Spitzer, the Attorney-General for New York State, threatened to sue 
the OCC: see Office of the Attorney General (State of New York), ‘Statement by Attorney Gen-
eral Eliot Spitzer Regarding the Comptroller of Currency’s (OCC) Advisory Letter to National 
Banks’ (Media Release, 1 March 2004) <http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2004/mar/ 
mar01a_04.html>; Eliot Spitzer, ‘Predatory Lenders’ Partner in Crime’, Washington Post (Wash-
ington DC), 14 February 2008, A25. See also Adam J Levitin, ‘Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating 
Credit Markets Upstream’ (2009) 26 Yale Journal on Regulation 143. 
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Bank NA.195 The Court held that the state regulators could not interfere with the 
‘business of banking’ of federally regulated institutions by subjecting national 
banks or their OCC-licensed operating subsidiaries to state audits and surveil-
lance under rival oversight regimes.196 
The same year the Fed held further hearings on subprime and predatory lend-
ing, and proposed increased regulation.197 An Act containing more substantive 
protection for consumers was finally passed in Congress in 2008.198 This Act laid 
the groundwork for many of the provisions in the subsequent Dodd–Frank Act. 
The conference report accompanying the Dodd–Frank Act indicates that the 
‘Federal Reserve Board failed to meet its responsibilities under HOEPA, despite 
persistent calls for action.’199 The Report highlights that 
[i]n spite of the rampant abuses in the subprime market and all the damage im-
posed on consumers by predatory lending — billions of dollars in lost 
wealth — the [Federal Reserve] Board never implemented a single discretion-
ary rule under HOEPA outside of the high cost context. To put it bluntly, the 
Board has simply not done its job.200 
The establishment of an independent and well-resourced consumer protection 
regime that encompasses research, education, complaints and enforcement arms 
provides a potentially powerful advocate for consumers. Critics argue that the 
CFPB has been given too much power.201 Others suggest that ‘consumers’ 
 
195 550 US 1 (2007). 
196 Ibid 21 (Ginsburg J for Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and Alito JJ). The Dodd–Frank Act 
seeks to clarify the role of state authorities and the standards and limits of pre-emption. It en-
hances the states’ authority to enforce state and federal law against federal banks and other finan-
cial institutions in specified circumstances: Dodd–Frank Act, § 1042, 124 Stat 1376, 2012–14. 
The Act confirms that it only pre-empts state law to the extent that state law is ‘inconsistent’ with 
the Act: § 1041(a), 124 Stat 1376, 2011. It also clarifies the pre-emption standards and the cir-
cumstances when state law is deemed to have been pre-empted: § 1044, 124 Stat 1376, 2014–17. 
See discussion in Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates, above n 8, 183–4. 
197 Inter-agency guidance was issued in July 2007: Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 
Fed Reg 37569, 37572 (10 July 2007). This guidance was prompted by concerns about the grow-
ing use of adjustable rate mortgages, with low initial payments for an introductory period and a 
variable rate plus a margin for the remaining term of the loan. These mortgages were being 
marketed to subprime borrowers and often included high-risk terms and penalty payments. 
198 On 30 July 2008, the Fed published a final rule — 12 CFR § 226 (2008), amending reg Z — 
implementing the Truth in Lending Act, Pub L No 90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968) (‘TILA’) and the 
HOEPA, §§ 151–8, 108 Stat 2160, 2190–8. Further, and on the same day, the US Congress en-
acted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-289, 122 Stat 2654, which 
included amendments to the TILA known as the Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008: 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, §§ 2501–3, 122 Stat 2654, 2855–7. The TILA 
requires full disclosures about credit terms and costs: 15 USC § 160. This section provides that 
[i]t is the purpose of this [title] to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair 
credit billing and credit card practices. 
199 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S Rep No 111-176, 111th Congress (2010) 
15 (Conf Rep). 
200 Ibid 27 n 77. 
201 See, eg, Marco Rubio, US Senator, ‘Time to Hold Obama Accountable on Regulations — 
Statement for the Record’, Right Side News (online), 8 December 2011 
<http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011120915131/us/politics-and-economics/time-to-hold-obama-
accountable-on-regulations.html>. Senator Rubio states that without reform, 
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interests were woefully underrepresented during the recent crisis’ and that the 
establishment of the CFPB is overdue and a ‘step forward’.202 
The creation of a single consumer agency potentially addresses the argument 
that the prior architecture inevitably led to consumer protection falling through 
the cracks, taking a back seat to the agencies’ primary mission of financial safety 
and soundness.203 One of the most tragic outcomes of the GFC in the US has 
been the large number of people forced from their homes due to mortgage 
defaults.204 Bar-Gill and Warren concluded in 2008 that ‘[e]vidence abounds that 
consumers [were] sold credit products that [were] designed to obscure their risks 
and to exploit consumer misunderstanding.’205 The evidence indicates that many 
of the practices adopted for selling financial products and services prior to the 
GFC had become abusive, and that accountability and enforcement mechanisms 
across the financial intermediary industry were weak.206 Numerous studies of the 
mortgage markets by government agencies and independent bodies during the 
2000–06 period found that many of the mortgagees sold high interest rate 
subprime loans would have qualified for lower cost prime market loans.207 In 
addition, scholarly and policy research found a correlation between unfair credit 
terms and minority status.208 In 2000, the joint Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and Department of Treasury National Task Force on 
Predatory Lending warned: 
In some low-income and minority communities, especially where competition 
is limited, predatory lenders may make loans with interest rates and fees sig-
 
CFPB’s director would serve with unprecedented and unconstitutional amounts of power. The 
director would have the power to decide what rules are issued in the name of consumer protec-
tion, how funds are spent and how its enforcement authority will be used. In short, it empowers 
a single, unelected person with seemingly endless and unchecked authority. 
202 Skeel, above n 46, 14–15. See generally Elizabeth Warren, ‘Unsafe at Any Rate’ (2007) 5 
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 8. 
203 Levitin, above n 194, 155. 
204 See Raymond H Brescia, ‘The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Conduct, and the 
Financial Crisis’ (2010) 66 New York University Annual Survey of American Law 641; Vincent 
Di Lorenzo, ‘The Federal Financial Consumer Protection Agency: A New Era of Protection or 
More of the Same?’ (Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 10-0182, School of Law, St John’s 
University, September 2010) 42. There are approximately 75 million owner-occupied residential 
properties in the US, of which 70 per cent are mortgaged. Of the 52 million mortgaged proper-
ties, one in seven (eight million) are in some stage of the foreclosure process or are at least 30 
days delinquent on a mortgage payment. One in five of the mortgaged properties are in a nega-
tive equity position: Brescia, above n 204, 651. The incidence of foreclosures are heavily con-
centrated in low-income communities and communities with predominantly black or Hispanic 
populations: Di Lorenzo, above n 204, 42. 
205 Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review 1, 100. 
206 See, eg, ibid 93; Levitin, above n 194, 151. 
207 Bar-Gill and Warren, above n 205, 38–9, citing studies by the National Training and Information 
Center, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and The 
Wall Street Journal. 
208 Di Lorenzo, above n 204, 59. 
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nificantly higher than the prevailing market rates, unrelated to the credit risk 
posed by the borrower.209 
In 2006, research on the Detroit area by the University of Michigan concluded 
that  
even within similar low-income neighbourhoods, black homeowners are sig-
nificantly more likely to have prepayment penalties or balloon payments at-
tached to their mortgages than non-black homeowners, even after controlling 
for age, income, gender and credit worthiness.210 
A series of criminal and civil actions relating to mortgage practices have been 
settled, or are underway. For instance, Bank of America has reached a 
US$2.8 billion settlement with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over claims that 
Countrywide Financial, which Bank of America bought in 2008, routinely 
provided mortgages to parties who they knew could not afford them.211 More 
recently, Citigroup agreed to settle the SEC charges of misleading investors 
about a US$1 billion collateralised debt obligation tied to the housing market in 
which Citigroup bet against investors as the housing market showed signs of 
distress.212 
In 2007, Warren proposed a new federal consumer protection agency to ensure 
minimum safety standards for all consumer financial products.213 The Dodd–
Frank Act seeks to provide such safety standards on mortgage products by 
encouraging the use of qualified or standardised mortgages rather than complex 
and expensive mortgage structures, and by discouraging the payment of exces-
sive fees. Critics argue the regulation will result in reduced product choice.214 
However, the provisions as they stand currently do not prevent the design of 
flexible features into mortgage products. The extent to which mortgagees benefit 
from sophisticated bells and whistles is debatable in any event. 
The new CFPB is a bold reform. However, the practical benefits of the regime 
to consumers will depend on the CFPB’s commitment to fairness in credit 
markets, the independence of the agency staff, the detailed final rules and 
 
209 US Department of Treasury and US Department of Housing and Urban Development, above 
n 192, 72. 
210 Di Lorenzo, above n 204, 59–60, citing Michael S Barr, Jane Dokko and Benjamin J Keys, ‘Who 
Gets Lost in the Subprime Mortgage Fallout? Homeowners in Low and Moderate Income 
Neighborhoods’ (Working Paper, University of Michigan Law School, 1 April 2008) 2. See also 
Brescia, above n 204, 641–2. 
211 ‘Bank of America Settles over Mortgages’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 5 January 2011 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/bank-of-america-settles-over-mortgages-20110104-19f22.html>. 
212 See SEC, ‘Citigroup to Pay $285 million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors about 
CDO Tied to Housing Market’ (Press Release, No 214, 19 October 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2011/2011-214.htm>. 
213 Warren, above n 202. 
214 See, eg, Rubio, above n 201: 
This bureaucracy holds the sweeping ability to limit choices when it comes to commonly-used 
financial products such as home equity loans, credit cards and student loans. Simply put, a des-
ignation from the CFPB director saying these products are ‘abusive’ could restrict the avail-
ability of credit to consumers and increase the cost of goods or services for all Americans. 
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consistent enforcement of the measures adopted.215 The history of consumer 
credit law in the US suggests the agency will be heavily pressured by industry to 
weaken the final rules and to supervise with a light touch.216 
VIII   IN V E S TO R  PR O T E C T I O N 
A  Legislative Provisions 
The Dodd–Frank Act clarifies the authority of the SEC to establish rules 
requiring disclosure of certain information to retail clients before they purchase 
financial products or services.217 The Act requires disclosure to be made in 
documents in a summary format that contain clear and concise information about 
the investment objectives, strategies, costs and risks, and any compensation or 
other financial incentive received by the intermediaries.218 Rule development to 
encourage clear, concise and effective marketing and disclosure documentation 
prior to the sale of financial products and services is a regulatory approach that 
has been used for many years, arguably with some success, in other jurisdic-
tions.219 
The most contentious financial intermediary issues were left open by the 
Dodd–Frank Act to further investigation and consultation. The Act requires the 
SEC to review the duties and standards of care applying to brokers, dealers and 
investment advisers when providing personalised investment advice and recom-
mendations in connection with the purchase of retail investment products.220 
While the SEC is given the power to establish a fiduciary standard,221 clients 
may consent to material conflicts of interest if these are adequately disclosed.222 
 
215 See Brescia, above n 204, 709–10. Brescia argues that ‘robust enforcement of the fair lending 
laws is necessary. … [F]or the CFPB to wield this authority in an effective way, it must be 
staffed by committed, competent and professional bureaucrats who will enforce both the letter 
and the spirit of the fair lending laws’: at 710. 
216 See ibid 708–9, where Brescia suggests that 
‘[c]ognitive regulatory capture’ of the CFPB by individuals inclined to favor industry interests 
could, in fact, do more harm than good. Thus, ensuring that the agency is staffed by individuals 
with independence … will be an essential first step in guaranteeing the success of the CFPB in 
carrying out its purposes … 
  See also the Sunlight Foundation Reporting Group, Dodd–Frank Act <http://reporting. 
sunlightfoundation.com/tag/Dodd-Frank>. The Sunlight Foundation is a non-profit, nonpartisan 
organisation that states that it is committed to improving access to government information by 
making it available online. Its website provides an updated record of the meetings between the 
federal financial agencies and outside representatives relating to Dodd–Frank Act reform issues. 
217 Dodd–Frank Act, § 919, 124 Stat 1376, 1837. 
218 Ibid. 
219 See, eg, Financial Services Authority (UK), ‘Good and Poor Practices in Key Features 
Documents’ (September 2007) 5–6; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Disclo-
sure: Product Disclosure Statements (and Other Disclosure Obligations), Regulatory Guide 168, 
6 September 2010; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Prospectuses: Effective 
Disclosure for Retail Investors, Regulatory Guide 228, November 2011. 
220 Dodd–Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat 1376, 1824–30. In January, the SEC reported to Congress: 
SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (January 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf >. 
221 Dodd–Frank Act, § 913(g), 124 Stat 1376, 1828–9. This issue was highlighted by the allegation 
that Goldman Sachs acted inappropriately when it recommended structured finance products to 
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The SEC is mandated to study a number of financial intermediary issues, 
including: how to improve investor access to intermediary registration informa-
tion;223 the need for greater regulatory oversight and enforcement of investment 
advisers;224 and whether to establish rules that restrict or prohibit certain sales 
practices, conflicts of interest, and intermediary compensation schemes that are 
deemed detrimental to the public interest and investor protection.225 The GAO is 
required to study mutual fund marketing,226 as well as identify and examine 
potential conflicts of interest within intermediary firms.227 
Regulation to enhance protection for direct investors (that is, investors who 
invest in securities without intermediary assistance) has also been strengthened. 
The Act establishes a new Investor Advisory Committee,228 an Office of the 
Investor Advocate229 and a retail investor Ombudsman.230 The Investor Advisory 
Committee, which represents retail and institutional investors, will advise and 
consult with the SEC on: 
• regulatory priorities; 
• issues relating to the regulation of securities products, trading strategies, 
and fee structures, and the effectiveness of disclosure; 
• initiatives to protect investor interests; and 
 
its clients while simultaneously selling on its own account: see SEC, ‘Securities and Exchange 
Commission v Goldman, Sachs & Co and Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ 3229 (BJ) (SDNY filed April 
16, 2010): The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Connection with the Structuring and 
Marketing of a Synthetic CDO’ (Litigation Release, No 21489, 16 April 2010) 
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm>. As part of a US$550 million 
settlement with the SEC in relation to civil charges that it misled clients, Goldman conceded it 
made a mistake by not disclosing the role of a hedge fund, Paulson & Co, to investors. The firm 
agreed to toughen oversight of mortgage securities, certain marketing material and employees 
who create or market such securities. Goldman will pay US$250 million to investors in the 
infringing deal and the remaining US$300 million will be paid to the US government: Susanne 
Craig and Kara Scannell, ‘Goldman Admits Mistakes in $US550m SEC Settlement’, The Austra-
lian (online), 16 July 2010 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business-old/news/goldman-
admits-mistakes-in-us550m-sec-settlement/story-e6frg90x-1225892552290>. Possible criminal 
prosecutions against the firm and individual employees are still proceeding. 
222 Dodd–Frank Act, § 913(g), 124 Stat 1376, 1828–9. 
223 Ibid § 919B(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1838. The SEC completed this study in January 2011: SEC, Study 
and Recommendations on Improved Investor Access to Registration Information about Invest-
ment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (January 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/ 
919bstudy.pdf >. 
224 Dodd–Frank Act, § 914, 124 Stat 1376, 1830. On 21 January 2011, the SEC reported to Congress 
regarding the need for enhanced resources for investment adviser examinations and SEC, Study 
on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations (January 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf >. 
225 Dodd–Frank Act, § 913(g), 124 Stat 1376, 1828–9. 
226 Ibid § 918, 124 Stat 1376, 1837. The GAO completed this study in July 2011: GAO, Mutual 
Fund Advertising — Improving How Regulators Communicate New Rule Interpretations to 
Industry Would Further Protect Investors (July 2011) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d11697.pdf >. 
227 Dodd–Frank Act, § 919A, 124 Stat 1376, 1837–8. 
228 Ibid § 911, 124 Stat 1376, 1822–4. In practice, the Investor Advisory Committee was established 
by Mary Schapiro in 2009 under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 USC App (2006). The 
Dodd–Frank Act provides specific statutory authority for the creation of the Committee. 
229 Dodd–Frank Act, § 915, 124 Stat 1376, 1830–2. 
230 Ibid § 919D, 124 Stat 1376, 1840–1. 
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• initiatives to promote investor confidence and the integrity of the securities 
marketplace.231 
The Investor Advocate will identify regulatory issues and problems specifi-
cally affecting retail investors.232 The new Ombudsman will act as mediator 
between retail investors and the SEC.233 
The SEC enforcement powers have been strengthened. The SEC may pay 
significant monetary amounts to individuals who provide information that leads 
to a successful SEC enforcement action.234 Monetary penalties may be imposed 
in administrative cease-and-desist proceedings against a person for a violation of 
securities regulation.235 In addition, the rules, penalties and standards on aiding 
and abetting have been significantly enhanced.236 
Finally, the Act tightens the rules on short selling. Monthly public disclosure 
on short positions is required,237 and short selling that is deemed to be manipu-
lative is prohibited.238 
B  Commentary and Analysis 
1 Intermediary Conflicts of Interest 
There are no easy regulatory or practical solutions to deal with financial inter-
mediary conflict issues. Full disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest 
is the most common and reasonable regulatory response. Empirical evidence 
confirms that clients do not always adequately comprehend or properly assess 
the effects of intermediary conflict disclosures.239 However, regulatory options 
such as prohibiting the selling of products when a conflict exists are not always 
feasible, practical or beneficial to potential clients. 
2 Intermediary Duty of Care 
The mandated study on financial intermediary duties of care and standards 
reflects the longstanding debate in the US on the differences in the applicable 
laws and regulations applying to investment advisers and broker-dealers. 
Financial advisers are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,240 
while brokerage firms are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 
 
231 Ibid § 911, 124 Stat 1376, 1822. 
232 Ibid § 915, 124 Stat 1376, 1831. 
233 Ibid § 919D, 124 Stat 1376, 1840. 
234 Ibid § 922(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1842. The rules adopted to implement a whistleblower incentive 
and protection program were issued by the SEC in May 2011: see 17 CFR §§ 240, 249. See also 
SEC, ‘Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934’ (Release, No 34-64545, 25 May 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/2011/34-64545.pdf >. 
235 Dodd–Frank Act, § 929P(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1862. 
236 Ibid §§ 929M, 929N, 929O, 124 Stat 1376, 1861–2. 
237 Ibid § 929X(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1870. 
238 Ibid § 929X(b), 124 Stat 1376, 1870. 
239 See Levitin, above n 194, 148. See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest, Regulatory Guide 181, 30 August 2004. 
240 15 USC §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2006). 
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1934241 and the rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’), 
a self-regulatory authority. Brokers are able to exempt themselves from the 
investor adviser regulation on the basis that the advice provided is ‘solely 
incidental’ to brokerage services.242 
The duties of brokers and advisers were vigorously debated in Congress and at 
the US Treasury Department during the policy reform processes. The initial draft 
legislation by the Senate Banking Committee removed the broker-dealer 
exemption from the Investment Advisers Act, However, the Congress was unable 
to reach consensus on this issue and no change was made to the legislation 
signed into law. 
The SEC was concerned that the regulation applying to the two intermediary 
groups differed.243 It argued during the reform review period that all intermediar-
ies providing financial advice should be subject to equivalent regulation and 
every financial professional should be subject to a uniform standard of con-
duct.244 It suggested the demarcation between the functions of the two groups of 
intermediaries is blurred and clients fail to understand the differences between 
the services provided.245 During the public consultation process, the SEC sought 
feedback on 14 outlined issues including (i) the potential impact upon retail 
customers that could result from potential changes in the regulatory requirements 
or legal standards of care, and (ii) the effectiveness of the enforcement of the 
intermediary standards of care. The large number of comments received reflected 
the interest and controversy surrounding this area of law.246 In January 2011, the 
SEC completed its study on the obligations of brokers, dealers and investment 
advisers and reported to Congress.247 It recommends establishing a uniform 
fiduciary standard for the provision of investment advice to retail customers — 
that is, the standard that currently applies to investment advisers should apply to 
broker-dealers when they provide retail advice.248 
The debates around possible harmonisation of intermediary duties and stan-
dards of care are linked to the nature and scope of the fiduciary obligations. All 
investment advisers in the US are deemed to be in a fiduciary relationship with 
 
241 15 USC §§ 78a–78III (2006). 
242 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 USC § 80(b)-2(a)(11)(C) (2006). 
243 Mary Schapiro, the Chairman of the SEC, told the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs that the services provided by brokers and advisers ‘often are virtually identical 
from the investor’s perspective’: Mary L Schapiro, ‘Testimony Concerning Enhancing Investor 
Protection and Regulation of the Securities Markets’ (Testimony before the US Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 26 March 2009) 8–9. 
244 See, eg, Mary L Schapiro, ‘Testimony Concerning SEC Oversight: Current State and Agenda’ 
(Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcom-
mittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 14 July 2009); 
Elisse B Walter, SEC Commissioner, ‘Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: 
Demarcation or Harmonization?’ (Speech delivered at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth 
Annual Policy Conference, Washington DC, 5 May 2009). 
245 SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, above n 220, 99. 
246 The comments are available at SEC, Comments on Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers, 
Dealers, and Investment Advisers (4 August 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4-
606.shtml>. 
247 SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, above n 220. 
248 Ibid v–vii, 110–39. 
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their clients and, as such, owe duties of loyalty and care.249 The courts have 
consistently indicated that the fiduciary standard requires advisers to act con-
tinuously in their clients’ ‘best interest’.250 The adviser recommendations must 
be suitable to a client’s circumstances. While advisers ‘may benefit from a 
transaction with or by a client … the transaction must be fully disclosed.’251 By 
contrast, the fiduciary obligations that apply to broker-dealers are less clear.252 
Laby suggests there is general consensus that a broker with discretionary trading 
authority over a customer account is subject to fiduciary obligations, whereas a 
broker without discretionary power is not a fiduciary. However, he notes that this 
general rule is subject to numerous exceptions, resulting in general confusion in 
this area of law.253 
The specific client outcomes resulting from the fiduciary obligations applying 
to the two intermediary groups are difficult to define or explain because of a 
dearth of case law on broker-dealer duties.254 Laby provides the example of the 
sale of securities to a client from the firms’ own account. He indicates that a 
broker-dealer can do this, but an investment adviser cannot because of the 
potential conflict of interest.255 He concludes that ‘advice is an essential ingredi-
ent of a broker’s financial services, rendering the solely incidental exclusion no 
longer applicable and justifying a fiduciary duty for brokers providing ad-
vice.’256 
Langevoort agrees the distinctions between the regulatory regimes are becom-
ing untenable,257 but warns there are no easy or comfortable solutions.258 The 
establishment of a general fiduciary duty for broker-dealers may not improve the 
current position because fiduciary obligations are by their very nature open-
ended.259 He suggests that the SEC needs to provide ‘more textured rules that 
 
249 Securities and Exchange Commission v Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc, 375 US 180, 191 
(Goldberg J for Warren, Black, Clark, Brennan, Stewart, White and Goldberg JJ) (1963). 
250 See, eg, Securities and Exchange Commission v Tambone, 550 F 3d 106, 146 (Lipez J) (1st Cir, 
2008). 
251 Arthur B Laby, ‘Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers’ (2010) 55 
Villanova Law Review 701, 718, citing Securities and Exchange Commission v Capital Gains 
Research Bureau Inc, 375 US 180, 191–2 (Goldberg J for Warren, Black, Clark, Brennan, 
Stewart, White and Goldberg JJ) (1963). 
252 For a detailed outline of this topic, see Laby, ‘Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers’, above n 251. 
253 Ibid 742. 
254 Ibid 705. Most broker-dealer disputes are handled through arbitration. 
255 Ibid 702. See also Arthur B Laby, ‘Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships’ 
(2005) 54 American University Law Review 75. 
256 Laby, ‘Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers’, above n 251, 742. 
257 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Brokers as Fiduciaries’ (2010) 71 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
439, 441. 
258 Ibid 441–2. 
259 Ibid 456. See also Mercer Bullard, ‘The Fiduciary Study: A Triumph of Substance over Form?’ 
(Working Paper, School of Law, University of Mississippi, 30 August 2010) 2. Bullard highlights 
that the fiduciary duty is inherently principles-based. The conduct standards that apply under a 
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apply to both brokers and advisers on each of the crucial aspects of the advisory 
relationship.’260 
We endorse Langevoort’s recommendations. The issue of harmonisation of 
duties of care across advisers is only a first step. Arguably, the more difficult and 
significant policy issue concerns the appropriate nature and scope of the inter-
mediary duties on a day-to-day basis. It is not easy to establish a duty of care 
standard that achieves an appropriate balance between financial intermediaries 
and clients. Determining what is in a client’s best interest at a particular time and 
on an ongoing basis can be difficult. Intermediaries, their advisers and clients 
need policy guidance that is as clear as possible on expected behaviour in 
circumstances that fall within the large ‘grey’ or uncertain areas. In practice, 
some clients, whether sophisticated or otherwise, are eager to take on risk during 
boom times but are quick to pass the blame to an intermediary when things go 
wrong. Most parties would concur that client compensation is justified when 
product or advisory disclosure is fraudulent or blatantly misleading. However, 
what should a fiduciary standard or a ‘best interest’ duty require from a broker-
dealer or a financial advisory intermediary when a client actively seeks riskier 
products such as margin loans or derivative products during the good times? To 
what extent are most clients able to theoretically and empirically understand 
notions of risk, reward and lifestyle flexibility? And should an intermediary 
determine the appropriateness of the financial products or advice based primarily 
on the ability of a client to absorb the risk? These are complex issues that 
policymakers, scholars, lawyers, financial advisers and investors continue to 
grapple with in all jurisdictions. The protection of investors and consumers is 
generally a paternalistic endeavour.261 Ultimately, policymakers need to carefully 
consider the extent to which investors and consumers should be accountable for 
their own interests, actions and decisions. 
3 Direct Investor Provisions 
The establishment of an Investor Advisory Committee, an Office of the Inves-
tor Advocate, and a retail investor Ombudsman are positive novel developments 
that other jurisdictions should note. The credibility of the SEC depends to a large 
extent on its actual and perceived ability to protect investors from exploitation. 
The cost of these reforms is likely to be low while the potential investor benefits 
may be significant. Institutional investors tend to have effective representative 
bodies with established access and relationships at all political and regulatory 
levels, whereas retail investors often lack sufficient resources, administrative 
structures, and political and regulatory access to gain an effective voice. 
4 Short Selling Provisions 
The short selling reforms are balanced and in line with global regulatory 
trends. Many market participants and scholars argue that short selling enhances 
 
260 Langevoort, above n 257, 455. 
261 See Levitin, above n 194, 148. 
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market efficiency.262 However, these claims are open to question when the 
trading is not disclosed or subject to any supervisory oversight.263 The provisions 
do not prohibit or significantly restrict short selling activity. Instead, they seek to 
improve market transparency by requiring disclosure of short positions on a 
delayed basis, and to enhance market efficiency by banning trading that is not 
driven by economic fundamentals. 
IX  RE G U L ATO RY PE R F O R M A N C E 
Important issues in relation to regulatory capture, competition for regulatory 
turf and the lack of action by regulators to developments prior to the GFC were 
not fully debated or resolved during the legislative review processes. Yet the 
success of the Dodd–Frank reforms will depend to a large extent on the compe-
tency, integrity and forcefulness of the individual regulators, and their ability and 
willingness to supervise the finance industry on an integrated basis. The  
Dodd–Frank Act will require proactive, well-informed and coordinated interven-
tion by the regulators to operate effectively. 
There are significant risks associated with the inchoate legislative approach 
and the number and extent of the required studies, reports and rules. The Act 
requires 60 studies to be completed and 533 rules and 93 Congressional reports 
to be written.264 The SEC must write 205 of the mandated rules and the CFPB is 
required to write a further 70. There are multiple stages required before the final 
rules are established, placing a heavy burden on the regulators.265 As a result of 
inadequate funding, the SEC is having to reallocate its existing resources to 
satisfy the requirements under the Act. This threatens the reach and efficacy of 
the SEC’s front-line functions such as enforcement.266 Further, the regulators, 
particularly the SEC and the CFPB, are entrusted with extensive discretionary 
powers, leaving the door open to regulatory capture by the very financial 
institutions that these bodies are supposed to supervise.267 
 
262 See, eg, Pedro A C Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson, ‘Price Efficiency and Short Selling’ (2011) 24 
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prepare for compliance. 
266 Congress initially authorised annual budget increases to the SEC for the next five years, with 
US$1.3 billion approved for 2011, stepping up to US$2.25 billion in 2015: Dodd–Frank Act, 
§ 991(c), 124 Stat 1376, 1954. However, this budget deal agreed to in April 2011 between the 
Administration and House Republicans resulted in significant cost cutting. The SEC received 
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offices to satisfy some of the requirements under the Act. The funding of the CFPB is more 
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267 See Skeel, above n 46. Skeel suggests the objectives of the Act are ‘right on target’. However, he 
is concerned by (1) ‘government partnership with the largest financial institutions’, and 
(2) ‘ad hoc intervention by regulators rather than a more predictable, rules-based response to 
crises’: at 8. 
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Regulatory capture is a major issue in the US, as in many other countries. The 
financial services industry ‘has been the single largest contributor to congres-
sional campaigns since 1990.’268 One study indicates that the largest six banks 
and their industry bodies spent nearly US$600 million lobbying Congress on the 
proposed reforms.269 Even the institutions that were bailed out using taxpayer 
funds paid significant sums to lobbyists.270 Volcker highlights the political 
difficulties the regulators face. He suggests the response to warnings of destabi-
lising developments in an institution or a market when things are going well will 
generally be: ‘We know more about banking and finance than you do, get out of 
my hair, if you don’t get out of my hair I’m going to write [to] my congress-
man’.271 
There is little doubt the world has changed since the GFC. However, the extent 
to which recent events have altered the cultures and mindsets of the regulators in 
the US (and elsewhere) is not yet clear. Posner argues that prior to the GFC ‘the 
regulators of financial intermediaries were asleep at the switch.’272 Volcker 
suggests there was ‘a certain neglect of supervisory responsibilities, certainly not 
confined to the Federal Reserve, but including the Federal Reserve’.273 It is easy 
in hindsight to argue that the regulators should have responded differently. It is 
more important to understand why the regulators acted the way they did, and 
what changes in approach are required for the reforms to succeed. The regulatory 
responses to developments in the home mortgage markets leading up to the GFC 
suggest that the US regulators need to radically change the framework used to 
assess the net societal effects of the financial policy they administer. 
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In 1994, Congress passed the HOEPA prohibiting identified abusive practices. 
In addition, Congress granted the Fed the power to prohibit other unfair, decep-
tive or abusive practices of which it became aware of.274 However, despite the 
mounting evidence of abusive home credit practices,275 the Fed emphasised 
educational campaigns to improve consumers’ financial literacy and initiated 
only minor regulatory changes.276 This approach was consistent with the well-
established global patterns of increasing deregulation and a strong reliance on 
markets — a fundamental belief in the ability of markets to deal with them-
selves, a view that regulatory interference in markets should be kept to a 
minimum, an emphasis on efficiency and economic factors, and a conviction that 
consumers should act rationally and look after their own interests. The actions of 
the Fed were also consistent with the long-standing policy in the US to encour-
age people to own their own homes. Based on these worldviews, the governors 
of the Fed saw the growth in the subprime market as a natural and positive 
development. They were therefore reluctant to interfere, and, even though they 
acknowledged that abuses were occurring, they determined that the greater 
economic good or the net societal benefit was served by allowing the lending to 
continue.277 As late as May 2007, Chairman Bernanke indicated that 
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deceptive practices. 
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we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader hous-
ing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers 
from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system. 
… 
Credit market innovations have expanded opportunities for many households. 
Markets can overshoot, but, ultimately, market forces also work to rein in ex-
cesses. For some, the self-correcting pullback may seem too late and too severe. 
But I believe that, in the long run, markets are better than regulators at allocat-
ing credit.278 
It was not until 2008 that the Fed significantly strengthened the level of 
protection provided to consumers by amendments to the HOEPA regulation.279 
Importantly, these amendments were made using its existing regulatory 
powers.280 
X  CO N C L U S I O N 
The Dodd–Frank Act represents the most substantive reform of financial 
regulation in the US since the 1930s. It contains some bold legislative changes. 
The establishment of a well-resourced single consumer protection agency may 
provide consumers with a regulatory body focused primarily on their interests. 
The reforms around trading of derivatives are important and may enhance long-
term economic outcomes. Likewise, the mere existence of provisions that 
provide for some of the losses arising from failed companies to be potentially 
borne by the management and directors may encourage more prudent and 
cautious behaviour on the part of well-advised executives and directors. 
However, the communication, implementation and operational capacities of 
Congress and the federal regulators over the next few years will be challenged to 
the limit as the vast array of rules are rolled out. The extent of required rule-
making under the Act leaves all parties facing significant uncertainties. The 
nature and scope of the reforms will only be known once the mandated studies 
and rule-making are completed and the regulation is fully implemented. 
Financial institutions will respond vigorously to the reform agenda. Wall Street 
lobbying to influence or derail the studies that have been mandated and to water 
down the implementing regulations will be intense.281 New financial products 
and innovations to minimise the potential adverse effects on institutions seem 
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inevitable. Indeed, the most certain consequence of the reforms is that both 
regulators and financial institutions in the US are in for a very interesting and 
demanding few years ahead. 
US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently highlighted the need for the 
right ‘balance between … rules that protect consumers and investors and the 
economy, without stifling the competition and innovation that drives economic 
growth’.282 While few parties would disagree with this aspiration, maintaining 
such a balance over entire economic cycles is notoriously difficult. The tempta-
tion for us all, including policymakers, regulators, financial institutions, other 
capital market participants and consumers, is to opt for short-term economic 
gains and to ignore or take insufficient account of longer-term risks and the 
adverse consequences of inaction. 
The success of the reforms over the long-term will depend heavily on regula-
tory performance. As Robert Shiller suggests, ‘It is a good Act but only to the 
extent that we make it a good Act’.283 Given the longstanding regulatory struggle 
around mortgage consumer protection leading up to the GFC, and the reluctance 
of the federal regulators to use their existing powers and discretion to intervene 
to mitigate the building excesses and exposures, the key question that arises is 
whether the regulatory responses will be different the next time around. Have the 
views of the federal regulators, particularly the Fed, fundamentally changed in 
relation to the ability of markets to order themselves and the necessity of 
regulatory oversight and action?284 Has the Fed’s conception, application and 
consideration of the ‘net social benefit’ test altered since 2007? Are the federal 
regulators willing to assess and determine economic policy goals using a longer-
term lens that better balances the longer term costs and public interest factors 
with the expected short-term benefits? And are the federal regulators willing to 
use their previous and new powers and discretion to achieve the stated purposes 
of the Act? An affirmative response to these questions will require deep changes 
to the culture and mindset of the US regulatory agencies. Whether these changes 
are achievable remains the pressing question. 
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